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ABSTRACT 
 
Multiform Segregation in the Context of 
the Urban Crises in Las Vegas and 
Los Angeles, 1930 – 1980 
 
by 
 
Colin M. FitzGerald 
 
Dr. Todd E. Robinson, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
 Multiform segregation in the context of the urban crises was a complex socio-
historical phenomenon.  The primary focus of this study addresses racial segregation 
in at least three basic societal areas: housing, employment, and education.  Through 
the spatial separation of multiple ethnoracial groups such as African Americans and 
Mexican Americans, multiform segregation precipitated the urban crises.  In the 50-
year period this study covers, Las Vegas and Los Angeles sustained a two-tiered class 
system according to the prevailing racial attitudes of each city‟s business elite.  As a 
resort city, Las Vegas could not endure ethnoracial tensions while Los Angeles‟ 
industrial base provided the city with the socio-political capital necessary to 
withstand rioting.  Research materials include oral interviews, newspaper articles, 
governmental reports, and scholarly manuscripts.  The main conclusion of this study 
reveals that multiform segregation was a citywide process marked by crises such as 
housing shortages, labor disturbances, race riots, and underperforming schools. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of Study 
 
 The primary argument being put forth in my thesis centers on multiform 
segregation as a distinctly urban process that precipitated crises in housing, 
employment, and education.  Although the urban crisis stemming from racially 
segregated public places, including hotels, parks, buses, and restaurants, was perhaps 
the most pervasive in mid-twentieth century American society, I will not consider it 
as part of my overall analysis.  In effect, it was the close proximity of ethnoracial 
groups in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Los Angeles, California, that pushed different 
peoples to interact and interrelate.  Yet after World War II, whites became 
increasingly absent from participating in race relations throughout these cities.  That 
is, through suburbanization and white flight, Anglo Americans avoided interracial 
contact by leaving the city. 
 With its plethora of casinos and hotels, Las Vegas is the archetypal resort city.  
As for Los Angeles, the industrial base that exists around San Pedro and Long Beach 
will qualify the city as industrial for the purposes of my thesis.  While Los Angeles 
could economically and politically endure race riots and labor strikes at times, Las 
Vegas could not.  Its reliance on tourism meant that ethnoracial disturbances had to 
be minimized.  The contrast derived from this industrial-resort paradigm holds vast 
implications for each city‟s race relations.  Since this paradigm coincides with the 
urban ethnoracial framework, it serves as an important cross-reference when 
analyzing the intricacies of both multiform segregation and the urban crises. 
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Urban Ethnoracial Framework 
 The urban ethnoracial framework is perhaps best understood as a progression 
from ghettoization in the early twentieth century to race riots in the mid-twentieth 
century.  Even though urban ethnoracial history overlaps with the traditional 
Montgomery-to-Memphis framework of the Civil Rights Movement, it is consistently 
viewed by scholars as a separate entity altogether.  The reasoning behind their 
distinctive separation ultimately resides in the regional differences that arise  
when studying African-American urban history.  For example, since this study 
investigates two Western cities, references to Martin Luther King, Jr. or Fannie Lou 
Hamer or any other Southern civil rights leader will be kept to a minimum.  That is, 
the Civil Rights Movement was predominantly a Southern phenomenon while urban 
ethnoracial history occurred first in Northern cities like Chicago and New York, but 
later in Western cities like Las Vegas and Los Angeles. 
 Although this thesis mostly addresses African Americans and Los Angeles‟ 
Mexican Americans, there is certainly a need for future research on Asian Americans.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, a concerted effort to deemphasize race in American 
society developed.  Sociologists such as William Julius Wilson have deemed class 
consciousness and social stratification as bigger indicators of economic success than 
race.  Such socio-economic postulates are becoming increasingly popular in a 
political climate that stresses a color blind approach to judicial matters.  Yet 
recognizing race in American society is essential for preserving the republican values 
upon which the United States thrives.  It ultimately becomes a viable means for 
addressing the various inequities that exist between certain ethnoracial groups. 
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Definition of Key Concepts 
 For the purposes of this thesis, there are several key concepts that merit 
clarification.  The differences between segregation, desegregation, integration, and 
discrimination ought to be clearly defined.  These terms are key components of this 
thesis‟ main argument, which deems multiform segregation a distinctly urban process 
that spurred the urban crises.  Multiform segregation consists of a unique combination 
of the aforementioned terms; all of which are socio-political processes.  While 
segregation is the systematic separation of racial groups either by law (de jure) or 
custom (de facto), desegregation represents the undoing of the separation that existed 
between racial groups.  Integration, however, signifies the actual mending of racial 
inequities and it necessarily follows desegregation.  Evaluating the effectiveness of 
integration is difficult, as the process should be about more than just having members 
of different races sitting in the same classroom or living in the same neighborhood. 
 Like integration, discrimination embodies a certain degree of difficulty when 
evaluating.  It is often considered synonymous with segregation, especially in the 
realm of housing.  But discrimination is surely distinctive from segregation in the area 
of employment.  As a socio-political process marked by racial privilege and labor 
segmentation, discrimination is perhaps best understood in the context of change over 
time.  In the reindustrializing period of World War II, blacks and Mexicans 
comprised an underprivileged and segmented labor force.  They held separate posts in 
factories and lived in separate quarters.  Ultimately, I believe racial discrimination 
changed in the deindustrializing postwar era, as ethnoracial groups like blacks and 
Mexicans faced labor exclusion in their ghettos and barrios. 
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Reasoning of Timeframe 
 The years 1930 and 1980 can serve as beginning and end points for this thesis.  
Ghettoization for African Americans and barrioization for Mexican Americans 
became largely solidified by the 1930s while voluntary desegregation replaced 
mandatory busing by the 1980s.  After World War I, massive rural-to-urban 
migrations occurred among certain racial groups, particularly African Americans.  
These migrations mainly altered urban populations in Northern cities like Chicago 
and New York, but Las Vegas and Los Angeles also began to receive Southern 
blacks.  Construction of the Hoover Dam in the 1930s and World War II defense 
spending in the 1940s brought great numbers of blacks to the Southwest.  The 
Bracero Program saw the importation of Mexicans, primarily in California, for 
temporary contract labor between the 1940s and the 1960s.  This mass influx of racial 
minorities into Southwestern cities certainly affected race relations. 
 Race relations, especially in Los Angeles, were chaotic during the 1940s and 
1960s.  These two decades are the central focus of Chapter 3, which covers race riots 
and the ghetto underclass.  Residential segregation and labor segmentation appeared 
to be the riots‟ primary precipitants.  Yet Los Angeles‟ Zoot Suit Riots in 1943 and 
Watts Riots in 1965 contained implications that stretched beyond racial injustice.  
They symbolized the failure of municipal governance, especially in the area of public 
services.  This idea directly incited the push to desegregate many of America‟s urban 
public school systems on a mandatory basis.  Without integrated schools, children of 
segregated backgrounds could never develop the kind of mutual respect for each other 
demanded by a democratic society like the United States. 
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Comparative Urban History‟s Pitfalls 
 
 Comparative urban history is a relatively new field of study.  Its origins date 
back to the mid-nineteenth century.  Charles Dickens‟ 1859 novel A Tale of Two 
Cities was probably one of the earliest examples of comparative urban analysis, but 
not in a scholarly, albeit academic, manner.  The field requires a focused framework 
to mold one‟s analysis into a reasonable study.  And therein resides the first pitfall.  
Urban historians who undertake a comparative approach must be wary in choosing an 
analytical framework that relates to the cities being examined and their areas of 
interests as scholars.  A second pitfall, which is contingent upon the first, involves the 
application of one‟s framework to every aspect of each city‟s history.  There are, 
however, occasional anomalies in a city‟s history that simply will not fit into any 
analytical framework. 
 Fortunately, these pitfalls can be mitigated by relating the local issues of each 
city to the larger issues of the nation.  This methodology for mitigating comparative 
urban pitfalls necessitates a comprehensive overview of the historiographical 
materials surrounding a given topic.  For example, a sizable historiography exists 
concerning school desegregation following the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
case.  Court battles over school desegregation became big areas of ethnoracial 
contention in Las Vegas and Los Angeles in 1972 (Kelly case) and 1976 (Crawford 
case), respectively.  Therefore, I think the extent to which Brown influenced the legal 
outcomes of each city‟s court cases constitutes an overarching connection that can 
serve as a major point of inter-city analysis while writing a comparative urban 
history.
6 
CHAPTER 2 
A PRELUDE TO THE CRISES: HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT  
SEGREGATION IN LAS VEGAS AND  
LOS ANGELES, 1930 – 1960 
Introduction 
 Investigating housing and employment segregation in Las Vegas and Los 
Angeles helps urban historians to identify the primary precipitants of each city‟s race 
riots and school desegregation.  I tried to structure my thesis like a chronological 
crescendo, as it covers increasingly bitter aspects of both cities‟ urban ethnoracial 
history until drastic measures occur.  And perhaps the biggest indicators of looming 
violence are housing and employment segregation.  As tangible commodities that 
contain what historians John Logan and Harvey Molotch call “use” and “exchange” 
values, housing and employment are essential components of a person‟s economic 
and social vitality.
1
  They embody and even determine the nature of class 
consciousness among residents in any given community.  But when housing and 
employment segregation produced heightened levels of racial tension, especially in 
the post-World War II era, people began to react forcefully. 
 Unlike school segregation, housing and employment segregation were deeply 
ingrained in American society.  The school desegregation debate began in 1850 with 
the Roberts v. Boston case while housing desegregation did not start in the courts 
until the early twentieth century and finally reached the Supreme Court in 1948 with 
Shelley v. Kraemer.  Aside from court cases, property rights have an aura of 
                                                 
1
 John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), 1. 
  
 
7 
permanence to them.  In fact, they are perceived by some Lockean idealists as 
indelible rights of Nature.  Yet property typically cannot be acquired without labor.  
That is, people must work to attain enough capital for the purchasing of property.  
Therefore, housing and employment generally go hand-in-hand when considering 
their collective societal impact.  Although this chapter addresses housing and 
employment segregation, there will be a greater emphasis on segregated housing due 
to the widespread socio-political implications that it holds for American society as a 
whole.  The primary problem facing segregated housing and employment, however, 
resides in the separate, and thus, unequal systems that developed in urban 
environments according to race.  In short, just as school desegregation meant forced 
busing, housing and employment segregation signified ghettoization for African 
Americans and barrioization for Mexican Americans. 
 
 
People, Property, and Labor 
 
 Before investigating the housing and employment segregation in Las Vegas 
and Los Angeles, it is important to examine the historiographical implications of 
urban and suburban space.  In 1947, African-American sociologists Herman H. Long 
and Charles S. Johnson published People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in 
Housing.  This work typified how black ghettos formed in urban environments 
through the effective use of housing covenants.  For the most part, these covenants 
represented a binding legal obligation written into the housing deed that imposed 
various stipulations from the seller onto the buyer.  Such obligations often contained 
elements of racial restriction whereby the seller of a house could not sell it to a buyer 
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of color.  It was these racial restrictions that entrenched residential segregation into 
American society.  And it was these racial restrictions that certain African-American 
constituencies sought to overturn in 1948 with Shelley v. Kraemer.  But little progress 
occurred until the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which provided the legislative teeth needed 
to minimize legally the effects of race restrictive housing covenants.  Yet as Long and 
Johnson found, housing covenants spurred the formation of “racial islands” in cities 
where black neighborhoods became “ill-kept and unsightly.”2 
 To explain their findings, Long and Johnson enumerate a variety of 
problematic features associated with urban black ghettos.  Two of these features, 
however, seem to be recurring themes, as they occur “in every major American city.”3  
The first involves the idea of black neighborhoods being “located in the oldest part of 
the city” while the second entails the notion of blacks as perpetual renters.4  These 
ideas date back to the First Great Migration during World War I when African 
Americans fled the rural South in favor of the urban North.  In general, the areas 
where they settled in Northern cities were former neighborhoods of European 
immigrants “such as the Little Italys and Little Bohemias.”5  Blacks therefore tended 
to occupy the leftover apartments and tenement complexes as the white immigrants 
eventually spread to the city‟s outlying areas.  Yet this concept of neighborhood 
replacement came at a high social cost for African Americans. 
                                                 
2
 Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in 
Housing (Nashville: Fisk University Press, 1947), 4. This sociological work was particularly 
groundbreaking because it represented one of the first studies done by African Americans on racially 
restrictive housing covenants. In fact, it reinforced the idea that African Americans disproportionately 
experienced the ills of poverty due to limited housing opportunities in urban environments. 
3
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2. 
4
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2-3. 
5
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2. 
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 The high social cost facing urban blacks primarily stemmed from the racial 
isolation they experienced while sequestered in a ghetto.  According to Long and 
Johnson, the “social costs of segregation” reside “in the isolation of one part of the 
community from another.”6  This idea represented the basic objective of racial 
segregation.  Isolating ethnoracial groups in urban environments served to maintain a 
stratified societal structure where certain peoples are guaranteed privileges at the 
expense of others.  The ultimate goal, therefore, behind a sociological study such as 
Long and Johnson‟s centered on examining the opportunity costs experienced by 
everyday African Americans. 
 Opportunity costs signified the biggest hindrances to racial equality that 
African Americans encountered when considering housing segregation.  That is, 
urban blacks had less economic opportunities than Anglo Americans, and thus, they 
had a lower social class standing.  The examination of opportunity costs helps urban 
historians to uncover the human agency component behind the collective struggle of 
inner-city African Americans against residential segregation.  In effect, through 
various Jim Crow statutes, middle-class whites became juxtaposed on the same socio-
economic scale as upper-class blacks.  The differentiation in social class scales 
corresponds directly to the notion of “congestion” in black sections of American 
cities.  While some sociologists viewed residential congestion as a negative symptom 
of racial segregation, others saw it as emblematic of communal development.  The 
latter idea became a fundamental tenet in Earl Lewis‟ 1993 book In Their Own 
Interests: Race, Class and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia.  Unlike 
Long and Johnson, Lewis deemed residential segregation as a vital mechanism for 
                                                 
6
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 7. 
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helping newly immigrated Southern blacks cope with the trials of rural-to-urban 
“chain migration.”7 
 As a complex sociological phenomenon, chain migration involves the 
existence of kinship networks among migrating individuals.  For example, a migrant 
might have both a prearranged place of residence and employment prior to embarking 
on his journey.  The chain migration that occurred between Northern and Southern 
African Americans has probably been over-examined by scholars.  But that certainly 
does not preclude it as a topic for future research.  Although it may have produced 
congestion in black areas of American cities like Chicago and New York, rural-to-
urban chain migration was an instrumental aspect of creating viable African-
American communities and workforces.  In the case of Los Angeles, however, the 
rural-to-urban paradigm became reversed as historian Douglas Flamming uncovered 
evidence to suggest that many black Angelenos had migrated from Southern cities 
like Atlanta, Georgia.
8
 
 Aside from Flamming‟s inter-regional study of chain migration in early 
twentieth century America, other ghetto synthesis surveys like Gilbert Osofsky‟s 
Harlem have examined foreign-based chain migration.  In the case of Harlem‟s 
African-American population, Osofsky found that discrimination became 
institutionalized when southern blacks began to settle the once white neighborhood 
after 1900.
9
  But the migration of Caribbean blacks into what eventually became 
                                                 
7
 Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race, Class and Power in Twentieth- Century Norfolk, Virginia 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 31-32. 
8
 Douglas Flamming, Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 40-41. 
9
 Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto: Negro New York, 1890 – 1930, 2nd Edition (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971), 131. 
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Spanish Harlem during and after World War I further reinforced the Jim Crow 
process already underway.  The racial infighting that ensued between Harlem‟s 
American blacks and Caribbean blacks became emblematic of the larger housing and 
employment struggles facing African Americans in cities.  Therefore, the American 
black ghetto possessed a stratified social structure, which not only confined its 
inhabitants to a specified urban area behind invisible walls, but also forced residents 
to endure the sometimes harmful effects that chain migration had on housing 
segregation. 
 But the connection between chain migration and housing segregation is not 
well-defined in the historiographical scholarship yet.  Long and Johnson address the 
connection by stating that “new waves of Negro migration to the North and West 
have swelled Negro populations in the cities to uncomfortable proportions.”10  
Ghettos had become overcrowded and there was a “general housing shortage” among 
African Americans in Northern and Western cities.
11
  Like Gunnar Myrdal, who in 
1944 argued that racial segregation contradicted the American Creed, Long and 
Johnson further that claim by contending that “the prevalent policy of enforced racial 
separation in housing” had become “a disturbing threat and challenge to the 
democratic tradition itself.”12  In a 1932 report by the U.S. government‟s Committee 
on Negro Housing, Johnson depicted urban black residences as congested, 
                                                 
10
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 102. 
11
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 102. 
12
 Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 103. 
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dilapidated, and unsanitary.
13
  In many American cities, black neighborhoods existed 
alongside areas of heavy industry, which negatively affected property values. 
 Isolated neighborhoods in urban environments with heavy industry are the 
prototypical aspects of ethnoracial housing segregation.  The images of an African-
American ghetto or a Mexican-American barrio spring to mind when considering 
residential segregation in cities.  But the relationship between ghetto formation and 
housing segregation has not been analyzed in depth by urban ethnoracial historians.  
This relationship ought to merit greater attention in urban ethnoracial historiography 
as time progresses.  The primary question facing urban ethnoracial historians, 
however, involves ghetto types.  For example, given its proximity to the 
manufacturing processes occurring around San Pedro and Long Beach, black Los 
Angeles (Watts) became an industrial ghetto with disputes over labor and housing.  
Alternatively, given its dearth of industry, black Las Vegas (Westside) was a 
residential ghetto driven by a combination of internal and external forces surrounding 
the local casinos and hotels. 
 Ghetto types are important insofar as they help urban historians to frame the 
various complexities inherent in housing segregation.  Perhaps the first and most 
complete study of the African-American ghetto is Kenneth Clark‟s Dark Ghetto 
(1965).  As a trained psychologist, Clark considered the ghetto to be an 
“institutionalized pathology” that terrorized the psyches of black folk and perpetuated 
                                                 
13
 Charles S. Johnson, Negro Housing: Report of the Committee on Negro Housing, eds. John M. Gries 
and James Ford (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 26-27.  This 1932 report prepared by 
Charles S. Johnson for  the U.S. government addresses the potential housing crisis facing black 
Americans in urban environments. 
  
 
13 
vicious cycles of poverty, crime, and suicide.
14
  Aside from the industrial and 
residential ghetto types, Clark provides historians with the pathological ghetto type.  
Although all ghettos are urban by definition, their type depends largely on the local 
environment.  Also, while ascertaining ghetto types, urban ethnoracial historians 
should acknowledge the interdisciplinary nature of their scholarly field by 
recognizing the socio-economic, psychological, and political elements of it. 
 Another frequently overlooked aspect of the relationship between housing 
segregation and ghetto formation is organized labor.  Since people tend to live where 
they work, employment and housing become intricately connected.  In effect, the role 
that trade unions played in determining blue-collar employment opportunities for 
urban minorities was significant.  Due to a low rate of higher education among urban 
minorities, manual labor jobs were their primary means of economic survival.  
According to labor historian James Olson, the basic structure of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which was one of the country‟s earliest and largest labor 
federations, “prevented uniform levels of racial justice in unions throughout the 
nation.”15  This idea encapsulates the uphill battle facing many ethnic minorities on 
the blue-collar employment front.  Fortunately for blacks, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) often served as a “viable alternative to [the] industrial 
paternalism and union exclusion” of the AFL.16 
                                                 
14
 Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 81. 
This work is fundamental in the ghetto synthesis debate that occurs in urban ethnoracial history today. 
It builds, at least partially, on Clark‟s previous work with prejudice and children at his Harlem Youth 
Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU), which was a social activist program designed to create greater 
prospects of education and employment for black youths. 
15
 James S. Olson, “Race, Class, and Progress: Black Leadership and Industrial Unionism, 1936-1945,” 
in Black Labor in America, ed. Milton Cantor (Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 153. 
16
 Olson, “Race, Class, and Progress,” 154. 
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 Aside from organized labor, the political economy of employment segregation 
was an additional factor in precipitating ghetto formation.  For the most part, a 
political economy consists of a dynamic interplay between governance, production, 
consumption, and employment in any given city or state.  Outside the African-
American ghetto, black workers generally represented a colonized labor force that 
responded to the whims of “the white working class.”17  Inside the black ghetto, 
however, a distinctive political economy developed around the socio-economic values 
of communal patronage and self reliance.  With respect to the urban labor market, the 
differences between the ghetto and the city at large were astounding.  Historian Joe 
Trotter appropriately captured these differences in Black Milwaukee.  His analysis of 
“the proletarianization of Milwaukee blacks” demonstrated an adept resourcefulness 
among the city‟s African-American workers in an exclusive labor environment.18  As 
a process, proletarianization refers to the transition of an individual from employer to 
employee, and as such, it is particularly applicable to industrial ghettos like Watts in 
Los Angeles.  Lastly, even though proletarianization was emblematic of downward 
social mobility, Trotter highlights the ability of Milwaukee‟s blacks to embrace their 
condition and turn an otherwise negative employment outlook into a positive feature 
of ghetto cohesion. 
 
                                                 
17
 William K. Tabb, The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1970), 115. 
18
 Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 39. Like Gilbert Osofsky‟s work on ghetto formation in 
the 1960s, Trotter‟s book was groundbreaking in the historiography surrounding urban ethnoracial 
history.  His ghettoization model shifted the emphasis from external forces to internal ones. In other 
words, blacks became the central focus instead of laws and whites. He emphasized human agency in 
the study of African-American urban history. Prior to Trotter, urban blacks were victims in the large 
structural processes created and maintained by suburban whites. In short, Trotter‟s book was the first 
to react and upend the ghetto synthesis literature of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Black Las Vegas 
 
 Multiform segregation in Las Vegas was an intricate sociological process.  It 
entailed the systematic separation of racial groups in the areas of education, 
employment, and housing so as to create and maintain the privileges of one race over 
others.  In a way, multiform segregation could only exist in urban environments.  The 
proximity of varying races to one another precipitated the kind of laws necessary to 
subjugate and confine ethnic peoples in urban spaces.  Las Vegas serves as an 
important case study for examining multiform segregation in the West.  It possesses a 
segmented labor force with evidence of residential segregation.  From education to 
employment to housing, racial segregation has existed in America since the first 
African-American slaves arrived in 1619.  But according to historian C. Vann 
Woodward, it was not until the 1890s that segregation became codified in laws when 
“the bi-racial partnership of Populism began to dissolve in frustration and 
bitterness.”19 
 In an effort to gain a greater understanding of Las Vegas‟ multiform 
segregation, it becomes necessary to investigate the Jim Crow South.  This region 
produced segregationist laws that were not entirely new.  These laws solidified thirty 
years of customary segregation based on the racial affinities of Southerners that 
existed from the late 1860s to the late 1890s.  Jim Crow segregation, on the whole, 
constituted a severe impediment to the fluidity of social relations.  Blacks and whites 
had to follow strict patterns of behavior in both public and private spaces.  For 
example, “up and down the avenues and byways of Southern life appeared with 
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increasing profusion the little signs: „Whites Only‟ or „Colored.‟”20  These signs 
made a clear statement that even though the North won the Civil War, the South 
prevailed in Reconstruction.  While the North attempted to rehabilitate the South in 
its secessionist ways, the South infected the North and eventually the West with its 
institutionalized racism.  And even though Jim Crow was originally a Northern 
theatrical concoction, it symbolized a racial mockery that placed whites over blacks. 
 Racial segregation was a sociological phenomenon that involved all races.  
Yet the starkest contrast, and thus, gravest inequities, occurred primarily between 
African Americans (blacks) and Anglo Americans (whites) in the United States.  Due 
to its agrarian society, segregation in the South was a predominantly rural occurrence.  
In the North, however, segregation was urban, as its cities contained the largest 
population bases of African Americans.  Racial tensions occasionally erupted into 
violence which caused economic strife and drove many Southerners from their 
homes.  Blacks and whites alike emigrated from the South to both the Northern and 
Western regions of the country.  By the 1930s, Southern Nevada was a particularly 
favored destination for unemployed Southerners. 
 The construction of Hoover Dam (originally called Boulder Dam) attracted an 
increasing number of black and white Southerners to Clark County, Nevada.  These 
Southerners brought both their linguistic twang and their racial customs.  Due to their 
growing presence, Nevada eventually achieved unwarranted notoriety in the media as 
“the Mississippi of the West.”21  But this description was largely inaccurate for it 
implied that Nevada possessed statewide de jure (legal) segregation.  When Jim Crow 
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did appear in the state, it tended to be highly localized.  Even though economic 
motives primarily drove African Americans to the West, many emigrated to escape 
the institutional racism of the South.  Yet according to historian James Hulse, 
employment discrimination initially confronted black Las Vegans in 1931, as “the Six 
Companies, builders of the Hoover Dam, refused to hire blacks on their construction 
crews.”22  Making matters worse for black Nevadans was the fact that Boulder City, a 
company town for dam workers, had corporate stipulations that required it to remain 
all-white.
23
 
 With its single-race demographic, Boulder City appeased Southern white dam 
workers and frustrated blacks.  In 1932, after a year of discriminatory hiring practices, 
the Six Companies employed its first black laborers to work on the dam.  But these 
African Americans still faced housing discrimination in Boulder City, and thus, they 
had to commute from Las Vegas on a daily basis.  The combination of employment 
and housing discrimination was actually quite foreign to black Nevadans in the Las 
Vegas Valley.  Yet it was this combination that permitted the feeble barrier between 
discrimination and segregation to disintegrate.  Customary segregation, therefore, 
became contingent upon the precedents set by the types of racial discrimination that 
black Las Vegans faced. 
Prior to the 1930s, “there was no sign of housing or social segregation in Las 
Vegas,” at least on a legal level.24  The city‟s lack of racial discrimination in the 
1910s and 1920s resulted from its relatively small population of African Americans.  
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Even by 1940, there were only about 200 black residents in Las Vegas.
25
  Despite 
such a seemingly negligible population, many white Las Vegans still pushed to 
segregate the city‟s African Americans.  Given their small numbers, black Las 
Vegans were almost a kind of anomaly.  Nevertheless, Las Vegas‟ early black settlers 
consistently experienced the evils of racism.  Multiform segregation did not become a 
sociological aspect of Las Vegas‟ burgeoning urban life until the Great Depression.  
But it was ultimately World War II (WWII) that accelerated the processes of 
residential and employment segregation in the Las Vegas Valley. 
 Abraham Mitchell was one of the earliest black settlers in the Las Vegas 
Valley.  He acquired a sizable plot of land for dryland farming under the 1909 
Enlarged Homestead Act.
26
  This federal law specifically targeted regions of the 
country with little rainfall, and thus, it increased the number of acres that a 
prospective farmer could potentially own.  Mitchell‟s farm mainly produced 
vegetables that he sold in town where the Los Angeles and Salt Lake (LA&SL) 
Railroad had its Las Vegas station.  Other early black Las Vegans, like Joe Lightfoot, 
were able to own land and maintain jobs, especially with the railroad.
27
  But as the 
city‟s black population grew, so did the presence of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK).  In 
1924, the KKK organized a parade down Fremont Street.
28
  For the most part, this 
parade appeared to have a two-fold purpose.  First, it demonstrated that white 
supremacy was the reactionary populist attitude of white Las Vegans who felt 
threatened by blacks in the Downtown area.  Second, it signaled civic leaders to 
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initiate a process whereby blacks would be systematically separated from whites, 
particularly with regard to Downtown businesses. 
 As economic conditions deteriorated in Las Vegas and across the country 
during the 1930s, “white townsmen informally supported efforts to move blacks from 
Fremont Street to the old Westside section across the railroad tracks.”29  Historian 
Eugene Moehring wrote, “everyone knew that at least for the next two decades, most 
commercial and residential development would take place primarily east of the 
railroad lines.”30  The city grew toward Hoover Dam, as it represented Las Vegas‟ 
main source of cheap power and decent jobs.  Therefore, black Las Vegans moving to 
the Westside (West Las Vegas) faced the prospects of both economic and residential 
isolation.  As early as 1932, the Westside became known as the “Negro Quarter.”31  
This label insinuated that “illegal activities” like bootlegging plagued the area.32  
With an ill-reputed image, Westside property values “failed to keep pace with the 
citywide appreciation of real estate.”33 
 Westside land values decreased as the black population increased.  This 
inverse relationship became especially clear at the onset of World War II.  In June 
1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which stated “that 
there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or 
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government because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”34  The primary 
reasoning behind Executive Order 8802 was interest convergence whereby the 
interests of all Americans, regardless of race, converged over the issue of national 
defense.  Interest convergence increased efficiency in the defense industry by meeting 
labor demands with workers from all ethnic backgrounds.  Southern Nevada 
experienced a labor boom with the 1937 construction of a processing plant for Basic 
Magnesium, Inc., (BMI) in Henderson.  Between 1941 and 1943, approximately 
4,000 African Americans arrived in Southern Nevada to work either at BMI or in 
other WWII-related industries.
35
  Such a demographic shift resulted in a housing 
crisis for the Westside, as its “black population exceeded 3,000, thanks to the 
recruitment efforts of Basic Magnesium.”36 
 Magnesium was one of the magic metals for aircraft production.  When 
combined with aluminum, it formed a light-weight alloy that was ideal for fuselages 
and wings.  Gabbs, Nevada, in Northwestern Nye County, contained high-grade 
magnesium ore deposits.  BMI mined and trucked the magnesium ore down U.S. 
Highway 95 into Henderson for processing at its plant.  The cheap hydroelectricity of 
Hoover Dam served as the main impetus for constructing the BMI plant in 
Henderson.  After processing, BMI shipped the magnesium to aerospace firms like 
Northrop and Hughes Aircraft in Southern California.  The intricacies of magnesium 
mining and processing brought around 13,000 jobs to Henderson, which was to 
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overtake Las Vegas as the largest city in Clark County.
37
  Yet black workers at the 
Henderson plant faced residential segregation.  BMI built only about 300 residences 
for African-American employees at Carver Park, which was east of Boulder Highway 
and separate from the white residences.
38
  To casual observers, it seemed as though 
these African Americans had become passive victims in an active process of 
corporate segregation. 
 But blacks in Carver Park and West Las Vegas did not necessarily perceive 
themselves as victims.  One such resident of the Westside was Lubertha Johnson.  
She arrived in the Las Vegas Valley with her family in 1943 during the labor boom 
occasioned by Basic Magnesium.
39
  As a result of employment discrimination, 
Johnson held a variety of jobs.  She first worked as a social worker in Carver Park, 
named for George Washington Carver, a peanut scientist at the Tuskegee Institute in 
Alabama.  Her work led her to conclude that “most of the black migrants who came 
seeking jobs in the metal industries were originally from two Southern states, 
Arkansas and Louisiana.”40  For Johnson, this conclusion helped to explain the 
employment discrimination facing most blacks in Henderson.
41
  In addition, Carver 
Park‟s housing segregation only exacerbated the fact that “blacks were usually given 
less desirable dirty jobs” at BMI.42 
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 Johnson‟s story epitomized the plight of other black Las Vegans living in the 
Westside.  She became a staunch advocate of African-American civil rights, as her 
40-year membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) indicated.
43
  Johnson felt that with enough hard work and 
determination, every discriminatory obstacle could be overcome.  Yet by the 1950s, 
the Westside still lacked adequate housing and municipal services such as water and 
sewer facilities.  In response, she joined “the Human Rights Commission of the City 
of Las Vegas” to address the housing crisis in the Westside.44  Johnson believed that 
part of the problem for black Las Vegans resided in the difficulty of securing 
mortgages.
45
  Las Vegas‟ banks were hesitant to lend money to African Americans, 
which primarily stemmed from the vestiges of New Deal practices like redlining.  In 
this regard, Las Vegas was similar to other American cities. 
 Another Westside resident who endured the effects of customary segregation 
was Sarah Ann Knight.  Her family came to Las Vegas in 1942, after her father 
obtained employment in Henderson.  She stated that there was “no housing over on 
the Westside” and that people had to either live in tents or “sleep in the streets.”46  
Knight‟s family was fortunate enough to live in “little shacks,” but they had to walk 
“as much as five blocks to haul water.”47  Automobile traffic in the Westside was 
sparse, as there were no paved streets.  Like Johnson, Knight also recalled how 
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difficult it was for black Las Vegans to obtain bank loans.
48
  As a result, many 
Westside blacks simply built their own homes out of any sturdy materials that they 
could find.  The ad hoc manner in which the Westside‟s homes and streets developed 
contributed greatly to its reputation as a slum.  But the fact that the Westside 
contained only African Americans made it a ghetto. 
 By the early 1950s, multiform segregation in the Westside was firmly in 
place.  After working as a dealer in the segregated Cotton Club, Knight fled Las 
Vegas in favor of Hawthorne.  She mistakenly believed that racial segregation was 
not as prevalent in Nevada‟s rural communities.49  Although Knight and her husband 
built a respectable restaurant and casino business that catered primarily to black 
laborers at the Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), they consistently faced bomb 
threats from their white neighbors.
50
  In 1957, Knight decided to move back to Las 
Vegas only to discover that the city was more segregated than before she left.  At that 
time, it became eminently clear to many Westside blacks that Las Vegas was 
approaching a breaking point with respect to race relations.  Given that public 
accommodations on the Strip were still off limits to African Americans meant it was 
time for blacks to take action.
51
 
 As members of the NAACP, Johnson and Knight sought to end segregation in 
education, employment, and housing.  The NAACP first organized a local chapter in 
Las Vegas in October 1918.
52
  Under the guidance of Leland Hawkins in the 1930s, it 
investigated the discriminatory hiring practices of the Six Companies on the Hoover 
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Dam project.
53
  In the 1940s and 1950s, the Las Vegas NAACP maintained its 
primary focus on ending employment segregation.  Without jobs, black Las Vegans 
were unable to acquire adequate capital for fighting segregation in education and 
housing.  Consequently, Johnson‟s NAACP efforts mainly concerned the segregated 
elementary schools in the Westside, while Knight‟s involvement mostly related to 
black voter registration.
54
  In short, it was the varying interests of the Las Vegas 
NAACP‟s members which ultimately pushed the organization to attack all forms of 
segregation by the 1960s. 
 The president of the Las Vegas NAACP in 1960 was Dr. James McMillan.  
Originally from Mississippi, he came to Las Vegas in the mid-1950s after being 
discharged from serving as a dentist in the U.S. Army.
55
  Along with Dr. Charles 
West, a medical doctor, McMillan was one of the only African-American 
professionals in the city.  He opened a dental practice on West Bonanza Road and 
bought a house on Wyatt Avenue.
56
  Both of these locations were inside the 
boundaries of the Westside, which included A Street on the East, Bonanza Road on 
the South, Highland Avenue (now Martin Luther King Boulevard) on the West, and 
Lake Mead Boulevard on the North.  The traditional boundaries of the Westside 
ghetto have expanded since the 1950s, but the core streets remain.  Unfortunately for 
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McMillan, his dental practice on the corner of Bonanza and H Street saw no business 
during its first month of operation.
57
  In order to attract more black business, he 
stayed open later, increased his involvement in the Las Vegas NAACP, and helped 
start the city‟s first African-American newspaper.58 
 Modeled after the Chicago Defender, the newspaper began operation in 1957.  
McMillan and West provided the initial funding; they were among the few black Las 
Vegans with enough economic resources to initiate and oversee such a task.
59
  
Originally called The Missile, the newspaper‟s name changed to The Voice in 1963 
when West acquired full financial control.
60
  The primary purpose of The Voice was 
to bring positive news on a weekly basis to Las Vegas‟ black community.61  It 
instructed African Americans living in the Westside to pool their money together in a 
collective effort to fight multiform segregation throughout the city.
62
  Since McMillan 
first published the newspaper out of the local NAACP office, he used it to transmit 
updates on the desegregation battle.  This communication method helped instill a 
sense of immediacy in black Las Vegans, particularly with regard to civil rights 
issues. 
 In February 1960, McMillan received instructions from the national NAACP 
office to organize against all forms of segregation in the region.
63
  As a result, he 
wrote a letter to Mayor Oran Gragson in March 1960, which threatened a black 
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boycott of public accommodations on the Strip.
64
  The boycott would also be 
accompanied by a civil rights march on Las Vegas Boulevard (The Strip).
65
  
According to McMillan, his letter would not have received the amount of attention 
that it did if it was not for Hank Greenspun.
66
  As editor and publisher of the Las 
Vegas Sun, Greenspun ran a story on McMillan‟s letter.  It garnered an immediate 
response from Mayor Gragson who called a special meeting with McMillan and many 
of the city‟s business leaders.  Yet the mayor “abruptly canceled the meeting 
(scheduled for March 23) after some political and business leaders expressed fears 
that it could become a fertile ground for hot-headed agitators.”67 
 After the meeting‟s cancellation, the potential for a civil rights demonstration 
appeared high.  But “word came on March 26 that the city would order the integration 
of all public places within municipal borders and the Strip would voluntarily follow 
suit.”68  McMillan did not have to act on his threats of a black boycott and march.  As 
a resort city that relied heavily on tourism for revenue, Las Vegas simply could not 
afford to handle race-based disturbances.  Tourists would have refused to visit a city 
mired in a civil rights war.  Although McMillan enjoyed the initial fruits of his civil 
rights victory, he began to question whether an integrated Las Vegas actually 
benefited the black community.
69
  From an economic viewpoint, McMillan believed 
that integration only helped white businesses flourish and black businesses suffer.
70
  
This mentality was similar to Malcolm X‟s rejection of civil rights, as he felt that civil 
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rights ultimately helped whites sustain their power structure.  Prior to integration, 
black Las Vegans had a distinctive place to call their own.  As an insulated 
neighborhood, the Westside represented a unique cultural milieu for the 
underprivileged.  But that was precisely what black Las Vegans had to relinquish in 
the name of equality.  In short, the drive for racial equality in black Las Vegas did not 
end in March 1960, as problems ranging from welfare rights to segregated schools 
continued to plague Westside residents. 
 
 
Multiethnic Los Angeles 
 
 Unlike Las Vegas, Los Angeles‟ multiform segregation involved multiple 
ethnoracial groups.  Due to the wide array of ethnoracial groups living in Southern 
California in the 1930s and 1940s, Los Angeles‟ multiform segregation was also 
multiethnic.  In effect, African Americans were not the only racial group affected by 
the city‟s multiform segregation, as Mexican Americans encountered it as well.  
Isolated pockets of residential and employment segregation existed in the traditional 
black and Mexican neighborhoods of South Central and East Los Angeles, 
respectively.  For the most part, I believe there are two schools of thought regarding 
Los Angeles‟ multiethnic segregation.  Either segregation was a systemic by-product 
of the city‟s expansive growth during the early twentieth century or it was a necessary 
evil in an attempt to control that growth.  Perhaps Los Angeles‟ annexation efforts did 
the most to further these two schools of thought. 
 In the 1910s and 1920s, Los Angeles embarked on a major annexation process 
to consolidate what were mainly unincorporated communities in its vicinity.  While 
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Las Vegas failed to annex the lands south of Sahara Avenue, by the 1930s, Los 
Angeles had grown to around 450 square miles due to annexation.  On the whole, 
annexation growth was coercive since it typically stemmed from a survival-of-the-
fittest mentality relating to municipal services.  In Los Angeles, the primary 
precipitant behind its annexation growth was the completion of the Los Angeles 
Aqueduct in 1913.  The unincorporated communities of the San Fernando Valley 
needed access to water, and thus, their options were either to incorporate and levy 
taxes to purchase water from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(LADWP) or join the city of Los Angeles as an annexed community.  A 1915 voter 
referendum by San Fernando Valley residents permitted Los Angeles to annex over 
150 square miles of land for the purpose of gaining access to municipal water 
services.  With the city acquiring large tracts of land through annexation, the drive to 
claim urban space among various ethnoracial groups became heightened. 
 The drive to claim Los Angeles‟ urban ethnoracial space occurred at an 
increased pace after each World War.  Domestic chain migration from the East 
brought scores of African Americans westward.  Whether their motives comprised 
finding work, securing housing, or escaping Jim Crow, black Angelenos increased 
from about 15,000 in 1920 to about 40,000 in 1930.
71
  Although this exponential 
increase of Los Angeles‟ black population continued at a similar rate in the 1950s and 
1960s, the circumstances were different.  Urban spaces had largely been claimed, but 
there is always a hint of temporality behind spatial relations, especially when 
considering ethnoracial groups.  Watts, for example, was once a working-class white 
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neighborhood driven by employment surrounding the railroad industry.  African 
Americans, in fact, did not become the racial majority there until after World War II. 
 The earliest socio-historical studies to treat Watts and South Central Los 
Angeles as a black ghetto did not emerge until the 1970s.  These early studies tended 
to highlight the external forces such as Jim Crow laws acting on urban blacks.  In 
“The City of Black Angels,” historian Lawrence De Graaf claimed the study of black 
urban populations in the American West has been largely ignored because Western 
blacks constituted “only 2.2 percent of the nation‟s Negro population” by 1940.72  
However, the census had long recognized Los Angeles “as one of only two 
substantial Negro centers in the West.”73  The two main questions De Graaf attempted 
to answer were: when did the city‟s black community form a ghetto and why did it 
develop in the way it did.
74
  To construct plausible solutions to the aforementioned 
questions, De Graaf drew an important distinction for the word “ghetto.”  In general, 
a ghetto is either “an area which houses people concerned with the perpetuation of a 
peculiar (and different) culture” or “a slum neighborhood characterized by poverty 
and physical and social deterioration.”75  Unlike most ethnoracial historians at the 
time, De Graaf embraced the former definition, which deemed Los Angeles‟ black 
ghetto a positive force for culture creation. 
 By 1930, a black ghetto had emerged along Central Avenue (See Map II in 
Appendix).  It predominantly consisted of “single-family dwelling units,” which led 
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many onlookers “to conclude that the city had no extensive Negro slum.”76  But Los 
Angeles‟ rapid development in the early twentieth century had eclipsed black 
frustrations.  Construction of railway lines and suburban expansion took priority over 
the social deterioration and racial confinement of particular ethnoracial groups.  Still, 
there was an overwhelming sense of cultural cohesion in the residential settlement 
patterns of black Angelenos.  Insofar as the ghetto formation process required racial 
unity, the city‟s African-American population centralized in a manner that brought 
members of the same race together.
77
 
 Similar to African-American ghetto formation, the development of Los 
Angeles‟ Mexican barrio contained elements of both racial confinement and cultural 
cohesion.  Neighborhood replacement affected the barrio, as Mexican Americans 
settled “along the Los Angeles River” east of Downtown in an unincorporated area 
“amid old housing tracts belonging to European ethnics of an earlier generation.”78  
Yet unlike the black ghetto, the Mexican barrio faced a linguistic barrier.  For 
Mexican Americans, the Spanish language was undoubtedly a source of pride in the 
barrio, as it signified a form of covert resistance to the de facto English standards 
outside the barrio.  Aside from linguistic discrimination, which limited housing and 
employment opportunities for Mexican Americans at times, the Eastside barrio was a 
place of architectural discrimination as well.  For instance, features commonly 
associated with classical Spanish architecture, such as red-tile roofing and stucco, 
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became adopted by white Angelenos to fashion their single-family homes in a manner 
that romanticized Los Angeles‟ Spanish (not Mexican) heritage. 
 The techniques of adopting and romanticizing Spanish architecture among 
white Angelenos were emblematic of a larger socio-political process.  According to 
architectural historian Dana Cuff, that socio-political process was “slum clearance.”79  
In effect, slum clearance permitted city officials to diminish the prevalence of Los 
Angeles‟ Mexican past by gentrifying neighborhoods.  To gentrify a neighborhood 
means to increase property values through building reconstruction and renovation.  
On the surface, gentrification may seem like a beneficent process, as it seeks to 
eradicate poverty by engendering wealth on a communal level.  But the unintended 
consequences of gentrification often entail the removal of underclass ethnoracial 
groups in favor of wealthier residents.  In short, “slum clearance” was merely the 
term used to describe urban renewal prior to the advent of the term “gentrification” in 
the mid-1960s. 
 Perhaps the most complex example of slum clearance in Los Angeles 
occurred at Chavez Ravine.  Although not necessarily part of the Eastside barrio, the 
Chavez Ravine neighborhood largely contained Mexican Americans in public 
housing tenements.  But in the early 1950s, Mayor Norris Poulson “was willing to do 
virtually anything” to attract the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles.80  Poulson 
claimed that he was working on behalf of a “legion of backers” who wanted another 
professional sports team in addition to the Los Angeles Rams.
81
  Yet according to 
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Cuff, there was a severe backlash against public housing in the city at the time.
82
  And 
since Chavez Ravine was one of Los Angeles‟ public housing epicenters, Poulson 
believed that it was a prime real estate opportunity for developers like Fritz Burns to 
build a new stadium.
83
  Burns and Poulson became close allies as “eminent domain 
proceedings” eventually evicted Mexican Angelenos from their tenements.84  
Ultimately, it was ironic for public housing opponents to argue that Chavez Ravine 
tenements represented “creeping socialism” while using eminent domain to acquire 
public land.
85
 
 Public housing tracts like Chavez Ravine became increasingly prevalent after 
Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949.  Even though the National Housing Act of 
1934 had already established basic home loan provisions through the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and the Home Owners‟ Loan Corporation (HOLC), the new 
law authorized large-scale federal funding for the creation of public housing 
complexes in municipalities.  The 1949 law also guaranteed public funds to 
encourage both slum clearance and community redevelopment.  In the case of Chavez 
Ravine, therefore, an incentive existed for Mayor Poulson to declare the 
neighborhood a slum.  Local urban renewal efforts had effectively become 
incentivized by the federal government.  It was now in Los Angeles‟ best interest to 
access federal funds for community reinvestment projects like the construction of a 
professional sports stadium.  For the Mexican Americans living in Chavez Ravine, 
                                                 
82
 Cuff, The Provisional City, 290-91. 
83
 Cuff, The Provisional City, 296. 
84
 Cuff, The Provisional City, 295-97. 
85
 Cuff, The Provisional City, 301. 
  
 
33 
who suffered from the unintended consequences of the 1949 Housing Act, they 
mostly relocated within the built environment of the Eastside barrio. 
 But the Mexican-American residents of Chavez Ravine did not succumb to 
governmental coercion without a legal battle.  One of the primary arguments made on 
their behalf was that Los Angeles‟ Housing Authority had no right to deed nearly 200 
acres of public land to the city (and eventually to the Dodgers) because that land had 
been sold to the housing authority by the federal government “for public use only.”86  
This argument, however, encountered resistance in the California Supreme Court, as 
it offered a “unanimous decision” affirming “the constitutionality of the city‟s 
deeding of the acreage.”87  In fact, as early as 1953, the city had the option to 
purchase those 200 acres of Chavez Ravine (public) land from the federal government 
for about $1 million.
88
  This option ultimately stemmed from a compromise worked 
out by Mayor Poulson between the federal and city governments, “which ended the 
public housing program in Los Angeles.”89  Nevertheless, it was clear that Chavez 
Ravine faced the prospects of Anglicization, as its Mexican heritage appeared 
increasingly whitewashed. 
 Since the city‟s original public housing plans for approximately 3400 “low-
rent dwelling units” in Chavez Ravine became nullified in the courts, the 
neighborhood‟s Mexican American residents had to relocate.90  Their initial 
migratory impulses led them to the Eastside barrio.  This intra-urban migration across 
the concrete-lined Los Angeles River was symbolic for the city‟s race relations.  
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Although the river was a marvel of physical engineering, it also signified a socially 
constructed racial barrier between Anglos and Mexicans.
91
  Historian William 
Deverell writes: 
A concrete river used to be a beautiful thing, a place where exuberant 
Angelenos would be able to stroll placidly amidst the visionary city that they 
had created, the city of the future, the city that had beautified itself by 
perfecting Nature. But concrete rivers are not beautiful today. The enduring 
irony of the Los Angeles River is that those exuberant future-obsessed Anglos 
do not inhabit the river‟s spaces. It is the immigrant and homeless, mostly 
Latino, people living in a depressing deindustrialized corridor who drink the 
water, swim and wash in it, and even farm its banks and belly.
92
 
 
This remark aptly encompasses the sharp divide between the appearance and reality 
surrounding the river‟s man-altered existence.  White Angelenos viewed the river as a 
symbol of progress to protect their high-value real estate from devastating floods 
while Mexican Angelenos saw it as a kind of invisible wall to solidify racial lines and 
section off their inferior property (urban spaces) along the Eastside. 
 With an increasing influx of Mexican Americans into the Eastside barrio 
during the 1950s and 1960s, some Latino families began to push further eastward in 
the hope of securing suburban property.  Just as black Las Vegans lived in the 
Westside ghetto and then expanded out to Carver Park in Henderson, Mexican 
Angelenos spread outward beyond the Eastside barrio to create their version of the 
American Dream in Los Angeles‟ eastern suburbs.  For historian Greg Hise, the 
socio-economic and political process of suburbanization, especially in Los Angeles, is 
synonymous with urbanization.
93
  He states: 
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In the past decades, critics and urban theorists who examine contemporary 
spatial patterns have begun staking the contours of a postmodern urbanism, 
presenting evidence that urban regions, such as the five-county Los Angeles 
conurbation, represent a new kind of city, a landscape with indeterminate 
coordinates, loosely anchored by speculative office parks, big-box retail, and 
gated residential enclaves.
94
 
 
This statement is akin to Lewis Mumford‟s “megalopolis” in which distinct 
metropolitan areas like Las Vegas and Los Angeles are linked by either 
transportation, industrial, or sociological means.  And given the cross-cultural contact 
that exists between the two cities, Las Vegas has become the easternmost suburb of 
Los Angeles.  Yet one of the primary sociological questions remains, where do black 
and Mexican Americans fit into the megalopolis that is Los Vegas? 
 One area where Mexican Americans began to claim en masse was La Puente, 
California.  Sociologist Gilda Ochoa conducted a case study of the Mexican-
American community in this Los Angeles suburb which examined the influence of 
immigration on the local culture.  For the most part, she argues that the 1940s and 
1950s Bracero Program, which brought thousands of Mexican immigrants to work 
initially in Los Angeles‟ wartime industries and eventually on the area‟s various 
farmlands, “created a social and economic hierarchy within the Mexican-origin 
community.”95  This socio-economic hierarchy extended into Mexican-American 
suburbs like La Puente, as a barrio developed under circumstances similar to Los 
Angeles‟ Eastside barrio.  In referring to the 1950s, La Puente resident Leticia 
Mendoza recalls: 
                                                                                                                                           
architectural framework for examining the complex proto-governmental and infrastructural forces that 
affect both urban and suburban development. 
94
 Hise, Magnetic Los Angeles, 4. 
95
 Gilda L. Ochoa, Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2004), 41. 
  
 
36 
We had a barrio, and it was from Central up to Valley Boulevard. We were 
not allowed to buy a home outside of Central. We were all segregated. We all 
lived in this barrio, and we all knew each other. The area isn‟t that big. Where 
the library is now, that was our school, called Central School.
96
 
 
The existence of La Puente‟s barrio, which was emblematic of housing segregation, 
reinforced the idea of a suburb as replicating elements of the core city around which it 
grew.  Barrios and ghettos, therefore, often became common features of ethnoracial 
suburbs where the majority race was not white. 
 Aside from La Puente‟s barrio (and its housing segregation), another common 
feature of an ethnoracial suburb was school segregation.  The primary goal behind 
segregated schooling in La Puente involved Americanization programs for the 
Mexican community.
97
  These curricular programs emphasized learning the English 
language and American culture while classes in civics and California history 
attempted to instill in the minds of young Mexican students a respect for American 
forms of government and authority.
98
  District Superintendent D. P. Lucas remembers 
the objectives of the barrio‟s Central Avenue School as follows: 
Mexican tots who were among the first pupils at Central have carried to their 
homes the type of instruction that is imparted in the school. These boys and 
girls, some of them, have grown to manhood and womanhood and have been 
able to create an entirely different attitude toward the institutions of the state 
than their parents hitherto had experienced.
99
 
 
In effect, Mexican-American (suburban) school segregation differed from the black 
experience, especially since the language barrier provided school officials with a 
definitive aim when developing Americanization programs.  But the black suburban 
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experience in Los Angeles occurred closer to the ghetto in South Central.  And in 
many ways, it did not occur at all. 
 Aside from a few upper-class black families who made their way to Pasadena, 
California, prior to World War II, many African Americans remained confined in Los 
Angeles.
100
  Essentially, Los Angeles‟ black suburbanization was a socio-economic 
process defined by “spillover ring developments” that stemmed from “increased 
housing demand.”101  Suburban cities like Inglewood and Compton began to receive 
an influx of black Angelenos from the Watts ghetto in the 1960s.
102
  Yet cities such as 
South Gate and Lynwood, which have nearly identical proximities to Watts as 
Inglewood and Compton, were largely successful in preventing African Americans 
from spilling over into their neighborhoods.  In short, racially restrictive housing 
covenants, and later, homeowners‟ associations (HOAs), were two of the biggest 
factors in determining the direction and scale of suburbanization for black Angelenos. 
 As evidenced by the limited nature of Los Angeles‟ black suburbanization in 
the 1950s, general African-American mobility within the city‟s limits was also at risk.  
Even though a few black families began to settle in the San Fernando Valley districts 
of Pacoima and Van Nuys, they faced “a pattern of housing segregation” similar to 
that found in the South Central ghetto.
103
  Nestled between Pacoima and Van Nuys 
was the district of Panorama City.  Originally developed as a planned community by 
Fritz Burns and Kaiser Community Homes (KCH) in the 1940s, Panorama City did 
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not permit the settlement of non-white ethnoracial groups.  But the largest pocket of 
African-American housing segregation existed “in an area of Pacoima bounded 
generally by the Southern Pacific track, Foothill [Boulevard], Sun Valley, and the 
boundary of the city of San Fernando.”104  This area of Pacoima was ultimately an 
example of both functional and racial segregation, as the Southern Pacific rail line 
functionally separated residential and industrial processes while Foothill Boulevard 
and other “artificial” boundaries racially separated Pacoima‟s residents. 
 By the 1960s, housing for African Americans in Pacoima and South Central 
(Watts) was becoming a crisis.  Los Angeles‟ black population faced a housing 
shortage, as families often endured congestion and overcrowding in homes that had 
been previously abandoned by whites.
105
  It was clear that access to adequate housing 
offered “the key to the goals [that black Angelenos] strive toward – equal 
opportunity, equal participation, [and] assimilation into the community as a 
whole.”106  In effect, adequate housing gave black Angelenos a sense of place that 
grounded them in the everyday life of the city.  Yet for the most part, Los Angeles‟ 
municipal government did little to address the housing needs of its black residents.  
The federal government eventually intervened in 1968 with plans for “a 220-unit” 
housing project in Pacoima.
107
  Although it partially placated the housing shortage, 
the Pacoima project arrived three years after Watts‟ segregation-induced violence.  
Black Los Angeles in the 1960s, therefore, underwent a transformation that started 
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with housing and employment segregation and ended with an urban crisis marked by 
race riots and police brutality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Overall, housing and employment segregation were deeply entrenched 
features of American society in the mid-twentieth century.  They consisted of 
physically and socially separating urban and suburban spaces according to the 
dictates of race.  There was an inherent fear among property owners that racially 
integrated neighborhoods resulted in depressed home values.  This fear resounded 
widely throughout the school desegregation debates of the 1960s and 1970s, but it 
originated in the post-World War II period of cookie-cutter-style suburbanization.  
For example, suburban tract housing, such as the development of Levittown, New 
York, between 1947 and 1951, was an exclusive process open only to white families.  
The racial exclusivity of suburbanization, however, was an outgrowth of the racial 
fears that existed in the city.  In short, racial divisions, especially in urban and 
suburban housing, pushed many American cities to the brink of violence. 
 Although employment segregation was not given the same attention as 
housing segregation in this chapter, it will resurface when discussing the relationship 
between social class and race riots in the next chapter.  The primary reason housing 
segregation often overshadows employment segregation when discussing these topics 
concurrently is that many urban ethnoracial groups tend to work where they live, as 
they do not possess the means to move when employment becomes scarce.  
Sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton recognize the heightened 
importance of residential (housing) segregation when compared to urban employment 
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conditions.  They assert that residential segregation deprives certain ethnoracial 
groups, especially African Americans, of socio-economic opportunities and privileges 
otherwise enjoyed by whites.
108
  This assertion speaks to the general lack of options 
facing residentially segregated ethnoracial groups.  Yet ultimately, through urban 
historical studies of these ethnoracial groups and their struggles with racial 
segregation, people will conclude that “the United States cannot be called a race-blind 
society.”109 
 As for the urban societies of Las Vegas and Los Angeles, housing and 
employment segregation were particularly prevalent aspects.  They contributed to an 
increasing degree of social isolation among certain ethnoracial groups.  Black Las 
Vegans, for instance, endured systematic separation from the city‟s white community, 
which often stemmed from either coercive laws rooted in an institutionalized racism 
or customary practices centered on a vibrant communal patronage in the Westside 
ghetto.  In multiethnic Los Angeles, however, both black and Mexican residents 
experienced the effects of racial isolation.  The idiosyncratic differences that 
developed between the South Central (Watts) ghetto and the Eastside barrio, such as 
the language barrier, only enhanced the degree of Los Angeles‟ ethnoracial diversity.  
And this diversity even extended into the city‟s suburbs, which was a notably absent 
feature of the Las Vegas‟ suburbanization (aside from Henderson‟s Carver Park). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE URBAN CRISES ERUPT: RACE RIOTS AND THE 
GHETTO UNDERCLASS IN LAS VEGAS AND 
LOS ANGELES, 1940 – 1970 
Introduction 
 Race riots and the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas and Los Angeles were the 
result of years of substandard housing, schooling, and employment for both African 
and Mexican Americans.  This chapter will primarily address the racial violence in 
Los Angeles, the Zoot Suit Riots (in the 1940s) and the Watts Riots (in the 1960s).  It 
will also consider the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas, which exists below the working 
poor.  As part of the American lower class, I think the ghetto underclass is often 
associated with the typical elements that define racial segregation such as public 
housing, underachieving schools, and labor segmentation.  And despite their 
reluctance to use a term like „undeserving poor‟ when referring to the ghetto 
underclass, sociologists like William Julius Wilson argue that “a culture of poverty 
and a culture of welfare” have developed around this largely ethnoracial social class.1 
 Conceivably, the most insightful way to view the ghetto underclass and its 
role in race riots is through the analytic frame of economic restructuring.  In the post-
World War II era, the shift in a city‟s economy from manufacturing to service defines 
economic restructuring.  Otherwise referred to as deindustrialization, this socio-
economic process pulled capital and jobs away from the inner city, which 
consequently brought about depressed circumstances for the ethnoracial groups living 
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there.  But the ghetto underclass cannot be understood merely as a product of postwar 
deindustrialization.  Even though the post-World War II era saw a net decrease in 
industrial output, which exacerbated working conditions in the urban core, the ghetto 
underclass existed well before this time period.  For the purposes of this chapter, 
postwar deindustrialization and the ghetto underclass will be juxtaposed in relation to 
the race riots in Las Vegas and Los Angeles. 
 
 
Mob Mentalities and Class Consciousness 
 
 Prior to examining race riots and the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas and Los 
Angeles, it becomes necessary to investigate the larger historical environment 
surrounding them.  In 1968, the United States government published the Kerner 
Commission‟s report concerning the race riots that erupted throughout the country the 
previous year.  This report was a product of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) and it became a bestseller after more than two 
million Americans purchased copies.  But apart from investigating “24 disorders in 
23 cities,” the Kerner Commission also produced a detailed sociological sketch of 
how America had become so racially polarized.
2
  Chapter 2 of the report in particular 
examined both “the kinds of communities” in which race riots occurred and “certain 
popular conceptions about riots.”3 
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 Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Chapter 2 in the Kerner Commission‟s 
report was the description it attributed to “the typical rioter.”4  It states: 
 The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was a Negro, un-married male 
 between the ages of 15 and 24 in many ways very different from the 
 stereotypes. He was not a migrant. He was born in the state and was a life- 
 long resident of the city in which the riot took place. Economically his 
 position was about the same as his Negro neighbors who did not actively 
 participate in the riot. Although he had not, usually graduated from high 
 school, he was somewhat better educated than the average inner-city Negro, 
 having at least attended high school for a time.
5
 
 
Notwithstanding its sweeping generalizations, this statement helps urban ethnoracial 
historians to capture, at least partially, the racial profile assigned to rioters.  It also 
provides insight into the potential reasons why a person would engage in such large-
scale communal violence.  Even though the Kerner Commission‟s report does not 
specifically address the riots in Las Vegas or Los Angeles, it still aids the socio-
historical framing of those events in the context of the ghetto underclass.  As a result, 
either disrupting the status quo of racial inferiority or rejecting civil rights as a white 
man‟s concoction seemed to be two of the primary motives for why African-
American men rioted.  So, was racial segregation in urban environments the root 
cause of the 1967 riots?  Urban ethnoracial historians now possessed a basic postulate 
from which they could research, discuss, and debate. 
 Aside from depicting typical rioters and offering reasons why race riots 
occurred, the Kerner Commission‟s report outlined a variety of choices facing 
Americans for the future course of race relations.  In effect, the two most viable 
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options included “the Enrichment Choice” and “the Integration Choice.”6  For the 
Enrichment Choice, “the nation would seek to offset” racial segregation in inner-city 
black ghettos by “creating dramatic improvements” through increased federal 
spending for these “disadvantaged” neighborhoods.7  Under the Integration Choice, 
American society would be drastically remade to reflect the kind of distributive 
justice necessary for preserving a democratic republic.  That is, the federal 
government would make a concerted effort not only to improve the infrastructure of 
the inner-city ghetto, but also to help members of the ghetto underclass move into 
“largely white residential areas.”8  Despite its interest in facilitating African-
American social mobility, the federal government had clearly placed the burden of 
integration on the ghetto underclass. 
 The burden of integration on the ghetto underclass, however, existed well 
before the Kerner Commission‟s recommendations.  In fact, three years prior to the 
publication of the Kerner Commission‟s report, President Lyndon Johnson signed a 
law to create the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  As part of 
Johnson‟s Great Society initiatives, this new agency sought to oversee an increased 
governmental role in urban housing.  In doing so, it built upon many of the ideas and 
policies found in the 1949 Housing Act.  That is, local urban renewal efforts ought to 
be prioritized in a manner that brings the greatest amount of housing opportunities to 
the largest number of underclass people.  But urban renewal and housing assistance 
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became increasingly politicized and racialized throughout the 1960s.  The primary 
beneficiaries of these new government programs were “senior citizens” and “low-
income families.”9  Since the ghetto underclass mostly consisted of low-income 
families, there was a high degree of ethnoracial tension associated with the enactment 
of HUD and its designated purpose of eradicating poverty through public housing. 
 As HUD re-centered the federal government on the ethnoracial tensions 
surrounding urban housing, especially in light of the escalating Vietnam War, it 
pushed the Johnson administration to enact strong measures for prohibiting racial 
discrimination in housing.  Originally intended as a follow-up measure to the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, which barred discriminatory practices in most areas of American 
society, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) provided the legislative 
wherewithal necessary to fulfill the basic promise of ending race restrictive housing 
covenants by Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948.  By ending racial discrimination in housing, 
the natural progression would entail a systematic end of segregation in urban 
neighborhoods.  Yet that progression did not always occur, and in many instances, 
inner-city segregation worsened.  The ghetto underclass began to develop a socio-
political disdain for the government‟s inability to address adequately its racially-
induced problems. 
 The socio-political disdain for government and its civil rights legislation 
among members of the ghetto underclass became endemic after the publication of the 
Moynihan Report in 1965.  Produced by the Department of Labor under the direction 
of future U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, this report “emphasized that family 
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deterioration – as revealed in urban blacks‟ rising rates of broken marriages, female-
headed homes, out-of-wedlock births, and welfare dependency – was one of the 
central problems of the black lower class.”10  In effect, “Moynihan‟s unflattering 
depiction of the black family in the urban ghetto” demonstrated that there was a 
dramatic rift between the white American nuclear family and the largely 
dysfunctional African-American family.
11
  Critics of the Moynihan Report pointed to 
its lack of insight on the communal benefits afforded to the residents of a black 
ghetto.  At times, crowded public housing fostered neighborly cooperation, close 
relationships, local patronage, and cultured schools. 
 In many American cities, congested neighborhoods and single-race schools 
were features of both the ghetto underclass and the black middle class.  When these 
two social classes found common ground in their opposition to government and civil 
rights, race riots erupted.  And one of the primary questions that followed rioting was 
whether segregation or desegregation could be highlighted as the main cause.  Yet 
what constituted the black middle class?  Sociologist Mary Pattillo-McCoy examined 
the black middle class in the Groveland neighborhood of Chicago‟s South Side ghetto 
and discovered that “being black and middle class” was often more challenging than 
being part of the ghetto underclass because racial obstacles became more intense for 
those blacks attempting to maintain middle-class status.
12
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 In Las Vegas and Los Angeles the black middle class typically coexisted 
alongside the ghetto underclass.  Yet both social classes tended to be viewed by their 
respective municipal governments as separate entities.  It was the plight of the ghetto 
underclass that merited the foremost attention from each city‟s officials, but the black 
middle class simultaneously struggled for employment in Las Vegas‟ resort economy 
and Los Angeles‟ industrial economy.  Ironically, the national welfare reform 
measures of the early 1960s, which the ghetto underclass needed, occurred “during an 
era of general economic prosperity.”13  These reforms affected local municipalities by 
encouraging the elimination of urban poverty through the expansion of 
unemployment insurance.  This policy was especially pertinent to Las Vegas, as it 
could not afford to have either race riots or an outward display of urban poverty due 
to its heavy reliance on tourism. 
 
 
Las Vegas‟ Ghetto Underclass 
 
 Since the majority of black Las Vegans arrived in the city either during or 
after World War II, there was not an extensive period of time for the ghetto 
underclass to meld together prior to the racial disturbances of the 1960s.  Los Angeles 
was similar in this regard, but its black middle class was much bigger due to a greater 
diversity in employment opportunities.  The large in-migration of black Las Vegans 
during the 1940s resulted from the high demand for labor at the Basic Magnesium 
plant in Henderson.  And many of the black migrants to the Las Vegas Valley 
originated in the Mississippi Delta region of the South, which included the states of 
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Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
14
  Given their rural and often impoverished 
backgrounds as sharecroppers, molding into Las Vegas‟ ghetto underclass required a 
vast sociological transition. 
 One black migrant to the city who underwent this transition was Ruby 
Duncan.  In 1952, she arrived in Las Vegas on a bus from Tallulah, Louisiana, and 
found work cleaning private homes before moving on to the Flamingo hotel.
15
  
Duncan became a member of “Hotel and Culinary Workers Union, Local 226,” which 
provided her with a certain degree of job security in addition to basic medical 
benefits.
16
  But union membership for black Las Vegans was still second rate when 
compared to white union membership.  Partially integrated, Local 226 was one of the 
only unions to recruit black members, as its leader in the 1950s, Al Bramlet, “made 
repeated trips to small towns in Louisiana and Arkansas, where he promised cotton 
pickers and mill-hands wages beyond anything they could hope to make in the 
Delta.”17  But until Local 226 “struck an accord with the largest Las Vegas hoteliers,” 
work on the Strip proved scarce for black Las Vegans.
18
 
 As a member of Local 226, Duncan worked as a hotel maid to support her 
family.  Apart from a five-year marriage to Roy Duncan in the early 1960s, she was a 
single mother of seven.  Historian Annelise Orleck has conducted extensive research 
on Duncan‟s life and has concluded that although she “had always spoken up for 
herself,” Duncan had a proclivity for “being a lone hothead” at times.19  This 
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character trait actually helped her when she began to organize against societal 
segregation, and subsequently, for welfare rights in the 1960s.  Nevertheless, when 
the Moynihan Report emerged in 1965, local movements for welfare rights, such as 
Duncan‟s in Las Vegas, were stymied to an extent.  The report tended to vilify the 
black single mother, which it perceived as being increasingly dependent on 
government welfare programs. 
 Although the Moynihan Report mainly discussed welfare rights and their 
impact on African-American families at the national level, it spurred local responses.  
Dozens of states, counties, and cities slashed their welfare benefits as a partial 
reaction to report‟s recommendations.  The 1967 race riots in many American cities, 
which the Kerner Commission investigated, can even be viewed as a violent response 
to the reduction of local welfare programs.  Nevada, in particular, passed “a 1967 
state law requiring county prosecutors to interrogate every Nevada woman who 
applied for [welfare] assistance.”20  At the same time, the National Welfare Rights 
Organization (NWRO) formed in Washington, D.C. to push for greater governmental 
action in augmenting the welfare rights of women and children.  And with astute 
coaching by NWRO leaders such as Dr. George Wiley and Johnnie Tillmon, Duncan 
became one of the primary leaders in Las Vegas‟ welfare movement. 
 Modeled after the NWRO, the Clark County Welfare Rights Organization 
(CCWRO) elected Duncan as its president in 1969.  Along with other Westside 
mothers, including Essie Henderson, Rosie Seals, and Alversa Beals, she first 
pressured Las Vegas‟ city government and eventually Nevada‟s state government to 
help those affected by the recent welfare cuts with food and clothing distribution 
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centers on the Westside.
21
  But Duncan‟s appeals went mostly unheard, as welfare 
reduction tended to be the dominant public policy on both a national and local level.  
For most black Las Vegans, especially single mothers like Duncan, the fight for 
welfare rights became a necessary task since employment discrimination in the city‟s 
hotels and casinos pushed many of them out of work.  Even though unions such as 
Local 226 had black members, questions of fairness remained with regard to the job 
opportunities available for blacks. 
 The local culinary and teamster unions began to face increased legal pressure 
from the Southern Nevada chapter of the NAACP.  In 1967, then lead attorney and 
director of the Southern Nevada NAACP, Charles Kellar, blasted Local 226 “and its 
secretary-treasurer, Al Bramlet, for failing to push the employment of its black 
members.”22  In fact, “Kellar threatened to cut the union down to size by asking the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to decertify it as the hotel workers‟ official 
bargaining agent.”23  For Duncan and other welfare advocates in Las Vegas, the 
heightened legal pressure on local unions by the Southern Nevada NAACP was a 
welcome sign.  If welfare rights for black Las Vegans did not become a reality, at 
least the opportunity to avoid menial labor and work for a decent wage seemed 
plausible in the not-so-distant future. 
 Yet seven years after Dr. James McMillan and the local NAACP reached an 
integration agreement with the city in 1960, black Las Vegans were still protesting.  
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Woodrow Wilson, a black community activist from the Westside and former Nevada 
State Assemblyman, recalled the importance of the 1960 integration agreement.  He 
stated: 
 It was a situation here in Las Vegas, even in the 1950s and early 1960s, before 
 the accommodation law was passed that no one was working above a porter, a 
 dishwasher, someone that‟s doing menial jobs [in the city], involved in the 
 gambling casinos, involved in any other situation Downtown…24 
 
This statement, which occurred at a civil rights forum in 1977, demonstrated the lack 
of job opportunities available to black Las Vegans prior to “the confrontation with the 
city” in March 1960.25  Wilson continued on to state that the integration agreement 
“was brought about by [a] concerted effort” on behalf of the local NAACP and its 
original members including Dr. Charles West, Lubertha Johnson, and Bob Bailey.
26
  
But despite the 1960 integration agreement, black Las Vegans and the local NAACP 
(now under Kellar‟s leadership in 1967), sought to augment and secure a greater 
degree of black civil liberties through the courts. 
 Even though Nevada passed a strong anti-discrimination law in March 1965, 
“many Downtown and Strip hotels continued to discriminate against blacks in 
employment.”27  The question of legislating equality was one that Kellar now 
challenged by filing a variety of civil complaints and appeals in court.  While Kellar 
began his legal assault on employment segregation, black Las Vegans protested 
outside various hotels and casinos along the Strip.  By 1969, these employment 
protests eventually carried over into some of the area‟s local high schools including 
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Rancho High School, Las Vegas High School, Clark High School, and Valley High 
School.  These school protests, which mimicked race riots, can be explained through 
the socio-political process of racial socialization.  In effect, the frustrations exhibited 
by unemployed black parents became impressed upon their children, who in turn, 
released these frustrations at school, often in the form of hallway shoving matches or 
schoolyard brawls.  But white students also racially antagonized black students by 
ridiculing them over the employment struggles of their parents.  Finally, in a rigorous 
attempt “to end the cycle of violence” in early 1970, school board officials announced 
the hiring of more black teachers and administrators.
28
  If black students witnessed 
more black teachers and administrators in the high schools, then the negative feelings 
of racial isolation would be somewhat mitigated. 
 
 
Los Angeles‟ Race Riots 
 
 While Las Vegas had a minor riot during World War II and in 1969 a brief, 
three-day disturbance in the Westside, Los Angeles endured full-fledged multiethnic 
race riots in the 1940s and 1960s.  Occasioned by World War II, Los Angeles‟ 
industrial boom attracted scores of migrants to the city.  Whether they were 
temporary contract workers from Mexico with the Bracero Program or inner-city 
African-Americans from the Southern United States, these migrants brought their 
cultural customs, which at times, elicited social friction from white residents.  
According to historian Mark Wild, “On almost any level World War II was a 
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watershed event in the history of Los Angeles.”29  Both the South Central ghetto and 
the Eastside barrio “sprang back to life,” as the demand for wartime laborers in 
defense firms saw the momentary relaxation of discriminatory employment 
practices.
30
  Given the looming threat posed by Japan in the Pacific, it was especially 
important for the federal government to streamline munitions production by removing 
racial barriers in the defense industry.  Therefore, in June 1941, President Roosevelt 
signed Executive Order 8802, which established “the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee (FEPC) to eliminate discrimination in defense plants.”31 
 In Los Angeles‟ numerous defense plants, however, “race relations were 
anything but idyllic.”32  Although World War II initially precipitated a “euphoria of 
unity” among the city‟s multiethnic work force, “darker developments” emerged 
between workers as the war progressed.
33
  After the Bracero Program began in 
August 1942, thousands of Mexicans arrived in Los Angeles County to perform 
agricultural labor.  The Program stemmed from a series of diplomatic arrangements 
between Mexico and the United States to meet the increased labor demand of wartime 
industries.  By importing such a large number of Mexican farm workers, more 
Americans were able to work in the defense plants.  Yet aside from the mass influx of 
Mexicans to Los Angeles, the Bracero Program spurred a deep xenophobic reaction 
among many white Angelenos.  Rooted in widespread racial fears, this reaction 
became violent with the Zoot Suit Riots in 1943. 
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 The Zoot Suit Riots complicated racial perceptions between Mexican and 
Anglo Americans.
34
  Historian Mauricio Mazón argues that it is difficult to classify 
the Zoot Suit Riots as “riots” because “no one was killed” and “property damage was 
slight.”35  Yet they signified a socio-political coalescence among Mexican-American 
youths, which brought a heightened sense of ethnoracial solidarity to the Eastside 
barrio.  And despite the ability of Mexican Angelenos to parlay their near whiteness 
into decent paying jobs at times, many of them still encountered discriminatory 
barriers while seeking employment in Los Angeles‟ booming defense industry.  Due 
to the Bracero Program, there was a societal stereotype that Mexican Angelenos 
ought to work strictly as farmhands in order to offer the defense plant jobs to the 
city‟s white residents. 
 The employment-based ethnoracial tensions between Mexican and Anglo 
Americans first turned violent in May 1943, but none of the incidents actually 
involved zoot-suiters.
36
  These violent street clashes, which resulted in numerous 
deaths, mostly occurred between white Navy servicemen stationed in Los Angeles 
and Mexican-American youths.  Yet when these Mexican-American youths wore zoot 
suits, they became pachucos or punkish gang members in the eyes of local 
authorities.  Originating with the swing jazz scene of the early 1930s, the zoot suit 
was fashionably symbolic for ethnoracial minorities like Mexican Americans because 
it reflected the urban subculture surrounding the daily struggles of barrio life.  When 
Mexican-American youths dressed in zoot suits, they felt distinctly opposed to 
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members of the white bourgeoisie who directed most of Los Angeles‟ entrepreneurial 
endeavors such as the defense plants.  And it was this feeling of socio-political 
disparity (class consciousness) that pushed these Mexican-American youths to clash 
with those whom they perceived as representing the dominant (white) social order. 
 But the zoot suit represented more than the rebellious subculture of Los 
Angeles‟ Mexican-American youths.  In the military, for example, it symbolized 
everything “that was morally and politically deficient with the home front” during 
World War II.
37
  Some young Mexican Angelenos, such as Alfred Barela, realized the 
societal stigma attached to the zoot suit, and recalled: 
 Ever since I can remember I‟ve been pushed around and called names because 
 I‟m a Mexican. I was born in this country… Pretty soon I guess I‟ll be in the 
 Army and I‟ll be glad to go. But I want to be treated like everybody else. 
 We‟re tired of being told we can‟t go to this show or that dance because we‟re 
 Mexican or that we better not be seen on the beach front, or that we can‟t wear 
 draped pants or have our hair cut the way we want to.
38
 
 
As a zoot suiter himself, Barela‟s statement captures the ethnoracial angst of the zoot 
lifestyle in Mexican-American Los Angeles.  Multiform segregation had facilitated 
the growth of an ethnoracial tension to the point where violence appeared almost 
inevitable.  Yet for violence to erupt, there requires a spark.  And that spark came on 
the night of Thursday, June 3, 1943, when Anglo servicemen encountered a gang of 
Mexican zoot suiters in East Los Angeles. 
 The Anglo servicemen, all of whom were sailors in the Navy, claimed to have 
been “jumped and beaten by a gang of at least thirty-five [Mexican] zoot suiters.”39  
In response, for the following four days and nights, Anglo servicemen proceeded to 
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target and assault both African-American and Mexican-American zoot suiters 
throughout Los Angeles.  Ethnoracial neighborhoods like the Eastside barrio and the 
South Central ghetto became semi-war zones, as officers from the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) frequently swooped in to arrest zoot suiters after they had 
already been beaten by throngs of white sailors.
40
  But the LAPD and “other law 
enforcement agencies” received praise from Governor Earl Warren for their roles in 
“breaking up the tense situation” surrounding the riots.41  In short, there was a general 
consensus, especially in the local media, which painted the ethnoracial zoot suiters as 
the riots‟ perpetrators and the Anglo servicemen as its victims. 
 Even though a majority of the zoot suiters targeted by the servicemen were 
Mexican Americans, there were still many African Americans involved in the riots.  
To downplay the role of race in the Zoot Suit disturbances, Mayor Fletcher Bowron 
cited the pernicious increase of gang activity among Los Angeles‟ youths as the main 
problem behind the city‟s street violence.42  He did so to preserve the city‟s racially 
tolerant image in an attempt to attract more minority workers and convince the 
Roosevelt Administration that, unlike Detroit and other martial cities where racism 
prevailed, wartime Los Angeles was not another bastion of Jim Crow.  Although 
rioting happened throughout Los Angeles, the Eastside barrio and the South Central 
ghetto (Watts) were areas of heightened ethnoracial conflict.  In particular, Rev. 
Francisco Quintanilla, who was a pastor at the Mexican Methodist Church in Watts, 
preached about the negative publicity that the riots brought to both Mexicans and 
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blacks in his community.
43
  In effect, Watts was in the process of becoming a 
multiethnic community, but the ethnoracial skirmishes associated with the Zoot Suit 
Riots had left a socio-political wound that would later be reopened in 1965. 
 By the time of the Watts Riots in August 1965, the South Central ghetto had 
become somewhat of an afterthought for city officials.  Urban renewal plans mainly 
centered on public housing projects in the Pacoima district of the San Fernando 
Valley, and even those did not seem plausible until the federal government intervened 
in the early 1960s.  Similarly, African-American lawmaker William Byron Rumford 
introduced a fair housing bill to the California legislature, which sought to equalize 
housing access for ethnoracial groups (and other underrepresented minorities) by 
prohibiting discrimination in the housing process.  After the bill became law, the 
Rumford Fair Housing Act faced intense resistance, especially from real estate 
associations.
44
  This resistance resulted in a 1964 ballot measure (Proposition 14) to 
amend the California Constitution and overturn the new law.  Although Proposition 
14 passed with a large majority in the 1964 state elections, it was eventually ruled 
unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in 1966 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1967. 
 Yet aside from Proposition 14, which partially precipitated the ethnoracial 
tensions of the 1965 Watts Riots, other socio-political factors were affecting black 
Los Angeles.  In a 1972 case study, Frederick Case found that “business 
opportunities” for black capitalists living in the South Central ghetto were nearly non-
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existent.
45
  The idea of a black “small businessman” in Watts during the 1960s was 
anachronistic since the early examples of communal patronage in the ghetto‟s 
formative years (1920s and 1930s) had become replaced by governmental agencies 
such as the Small Business Administration (SBA).
46
  Despite the purpose of these 
governmental agencies to provide small businesses with advice and credit, they 
mostly avoided urban ghettos like South Central because they deemed the small 
businesses there too “high-risk.”47  In short, small-business capitalism in black 
ghettos like Watts was the first casualty of the new urban economics forged in the 
post-World War II period. 
 As Carl Abbott and other historians have noted, progressive-minded business 
elites gradually took control of Western city governments during and after World War 
II.
48
  It was not for new factories that these elites cleared space, but for office 
buildings and other structures serving America‟s growing service-sector economy.  
This urban renewal process ultimately provided thousands of new jobs for mostly 
white, college-educated workers.  Yet “the economic plight of [urban] black 
communities,” which partly stemmed from deindustrialization, could not be 
prevented by the mere presence of these revitalization programs.
49
  Apart from these 
programs, it was the lack of black-owned businesses in Watts that contributed greatly 
to the high unemployment rate of African Americans in South Central.  And 
governmental efforts “to foster minority capitalism” through improvement programs 
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in areas like Watts “have ignored, or been oblivious to, the economics of job 
creation” and “minority employability.”50 
 With black frustrations mounting over the dearth of economic opportunities in 
Watts, ethnoracial tensions were high.  The potential for rioting existed on multiple 
socio-political levels, as black workers and white authorities (LAPD, city officials) 
were growing increasingly antagonistic.  And like the Zoot Suit Riots, a distinctive 
spark set off the Watts Riots.  On the night of August 11, 1965, an African-American 
man named Marquette Frye faced arrest after being pulled over by the LAPD for 
driving while intoxicated.  His arrest brought scores of Watts‟ residents into the 
streets, as a police struggle ensued with Frye and his family.  Rumors of police 
brutality began to spread throughout South Central and “crowds of angry blacks” 
started torching homes and businesses over “a 46-square mile inner-city area.”51  
Mayor Sam Yorty‟s response was simple but somewhat ineffective: bring in the 
National Guard and hold a curfew.  Coincidentally, close to “70 percent of Los 
Angeles County‟s 650,000 blacks” lived inside the boundaries of that 46-square mile 
zone.
52
 
 After nearly 40 deaths and 4,000 arrests, the Watts Riots, which lasted for six 
days, had taken both a physical and mental toll on Los Angeles and her residents.  A 
majority of Angelenos “had regarded their community as immune to this kind of 
violent disturbance.”53  Whether the Watts Riots resulted from inadequate municipal 
services, i.e., schools, infrastructure, and transportation, or the lack of economic and 
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housing opportunities for black Angelenos, the recurring theme of the ghetto 
underclass (inner-city poor) remained present.
54
  In a December 1965 report by the 
Governor‟s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission), three 
potential causes of the riots received attention.  The first was the fact that Los 
Angeles‟ black population had “increased almost tenfold from 75,000 in 1940 to 
650,000 in 1965.”55  The second entailed the ethnoracial controversy of Proposition 
14 and the Rumford Fair Housing Act while the third highlighted the near parity of 
Watts‟ black and Mexican populations.56  This last demographic point concerning 
black and Mexican Angelenos was particularly important because it demonstrated the 
extent of ethnoracial competition for jobs and housing in South Central. 
 The near parity of Watts‟ black and Mexican populations by the mid-1960s 
pushed many black Angelenos to adopt some of basic the tenets surrounding the 
Black Power movement.  With an emphasis on the culture of blackness, the Black 
Power movement sought to uplift African Americans by utilizing black history to 
chart a path to self-sufficiency in black communities.  A black resident of South 
Central, Robert Mason, explained the Watts Riots from a Black Power perspective: 
 My thought is that any black community has to go through three different 
 stages. Number one is the destructive stage, in the case of Watts the „65 
 revolution. The second stage would be the unity stage, with the idea of self- 
 reliance and socio-economic independence of the black community. Number 
 three would be integration or, at least, peaceful coexistence. But at this 
 particular point in time, black people realize that there is no such thing as 
 integration. Integration has to be done on the [white] man‟s terms. It means 
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 accepting the society and accepting white values and white laws. But this isn‟t 
 us.
57
 
 
Mason‟s explanation signified the anti-integration stance assumed by most Black 
Power advocates.  As a socio-political process, the integration of Watts had failed.  
And it failed precisely because it was never actually attempted in the first place.  
Adequate municipal services were practically non-existent while black schools often 
faced closure without being rearranged to reflect the main tenets of racial integration.  
In brief, the development of a mutual respect between black and white Angelenos still 
remained at large in the 1960s. 
 Developing mutual respect among black and white Angelenos initially 
required the recognition of inequality as a problem.  And from that recognition, 
Angelenos can begin to connect inequality with race.  One South Central resident, 
Paul Williams, understood the problem that emerged when attempting to connect race 
and inequality in a black ghetto like Watts: 
 But the problem, as it exists now, is black people in this country, and I‟m 
 black, so I‟m part of the problem. You live with the problem, you die with the 
 problem, you think with the problem, you do everything with the problem. I 
 think I have a unique responsibility. I don‟t know if it‟s to my people, for my 
 people, whatever, but I kind of think more than just about my family – I think 
 about everybody in the neighborhood.
58
 
 
Williams‟ remarks were reminiscent of Norman Rockwell‟s 1960 painting of Ruby 
Bridges (The Problem We All Live With) where she is depicted on the first day of 
school integration in New Orleans.  In effect, many black residents of Watts felt a 
communal responsibility to maintain their neighborhood‟s security, and thus, the 
Watts Riots were troubling.  There was plenty of culpability for the riots to be 
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allocated, but the American societal consciousness had already determined that inner-
city blacks were the primary problem. 
 Black frustrations constituted the main reasons behind the designation of 
black Angelenos as the primary problem of the Watts Riots.  These frustrations 
continued for years after the riots.  They mostly stemmed from Watts‟ “high black 
unemployment” rate “and an increasing shortage of affordable housing [for blacks] in 
Los Angeles.”59  Despite the limited socio-economic opportunities for many of Watts‟ 
black residents, most of them “do not seem to be eager to move out of the area.”60  
Yet although Watts became increasingly multiethnic in the years following the riots, 
there was still a collective feeling among African Americans of being “trapped in 
their neighborhood,” which consequently resulted in a downward sense of social 
mobility (proletarianization) for black Angelenos throughout the city.
61
  In short, 
perhaps the Watts Riots‟ most indelible feature entailed the attention that it brought to 
the afflictions of the ghetto underclass in urban environments. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Overall, urban crises erupted in Las Vegas and Los Angeles during and after 
World War II.  They mainly consisted of race riots that stemmed from a frustrated 
ghetto underclass.  Comprised of inner-city African Americans, the ghetto underclass 
experienced limited socio-economic opportunities.  But in Los Angeles, there also 
existed a barrio underclass in which many Mexican-American males found communal 
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solidarity in the zoot suit lifestyle.  From housing shortages to job discrimination to 
underperforming schools, Las Vegas‟ Westside and Los Angeles‟ Watts constituted 
epicenters for the failings of municipal governance.  Frequently, the police were the 
only consistent municipal service afforded to the residents in each city‟s ghetto.  
Given that roads often went unpaved and sewer systems were ill-maintained, the 
ghetto‟s basic infrastructure left much to be desired.  At the same time, it was the lack 
of adequate municipal services that rallied the ghetto underclass to embrace their 
disadvantaged status as a fundamental component of black culture.  At the very least, 
the ghetto represented a definitive urban space that inner-city African Americans 
could call their own. 
 As basic socio-political and ethnoracial components of the inner city, ghettos 
and barrios have become stigmatized at times by historians, economists, politicians, 
and sociologists alike.  Through the analytic frame of economic restructuring, which 
can otherwise be referred to as deindustrialization, everyday residents of the ghetto 
and barrio were often considered pawns in a larger structural process.  The key 
therefore to uncovering the ghetto/barrio underclass and their collective role in each 
city‟s race riots was to analyze the personal statements of people such as Woodrow 
Wilson in Las Vegas or Alfred Barela in Los Angeles.  Their statements, along with 
others by ghetto/barrio residents, offer special insight into how ethnoracial conflicts 
occurred in the context of underprivileged urban environments.  In the end, both 
cities‟ race riots made the ghetto/barrio underclass a visible yet isolated socio-
political entity that demanded the attention of all city residents in order to reconcile. 
 
  
 
64 
CHAPTER 4 
AGAINST ALL INSTINCTS: MANDATORY BUSING AND  
 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LAS VEGAS 
 
AND LOS ANGELES, 1950 – 1980 
 
Introduction 
 
 Mandatory busing and school desegregation in Las Vegas and Los Angeles 
were intricate by-products of the Civil Rights Movement.  Each city‟s mandatory 
busing experiments constituted a visceral reaction to the larger process of societal 
segregation.  In general, societal segregation entailed a systematic separation of the 
races, so that one social group could maintain certain privileges over the other(s).  
While school desegregation sought to undo separation between the races, school 
integration attempted to smooth over the crudeness of desegregation by creating 
adequate racial balances.
1
  During the twentieth-century, Americans saw a wall of 
separation between blacks and whites.  Otherwise called Jim Crow, this wall divided 
blacks and whites to the point where blacks became second-class citizens.  Therefore, 
I believe that rectifying the negative effects of racial segregation required a drastic 
measure, and forced busing surely qualified as such. 
 Undoing societal segregation was a daunting endeavor.  Civil rights 
organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) did not necessarily know where to begin at first.  By the 1950s, racial 
segregation existed at virtually every level of American society including 
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neighborhoods, jobs, hotels, buses, trains, theaters, and schools.  With their varied 
understandings of constitutional law in hand, NAACP legal pioneers such as 
Thurgood Marshall and Julius Chambers decided that schools were the most logical 
places to initiate desegregation.  Public education was an agent of fundamental 
change, and thus, teaching young children in integrated schools to respect not only 
themselves, but also their fellow students was vital to the working order of a 
republican society like the United States. 
 
 
Historiographical Debate and Psychological Dilemma 
 
To understand forced busing in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, it is important to 
examine the historiography and psychology surrounding school desegregation.  
Integrating the public schools required a certain “will to power” in America‟s black 
community.
2
  The will to power was “simply the will to life,” and black Americans 
certainly exhibited this trait in the face of societal segregation.
3
  As second-class 
citizens, they pushed for dynamic change within the heart of American democracy: 
the public schools.  The separate-but-equal doctrine, which originated with the 1896 
Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme Court case, proved a serious bane in African-American 
life.  In the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case, however, the Court overturned 
the separate-but-equal doctrine after ruling that segregated schools were 
unconstitutional.  Despite Brown II (1955), which ordered school desegregation 
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efforts to occur “with all deliberate speed,” for the next ten years the Warren Court 
and federal district court judges in the South issued numerous rulings that reinforced 
the first Brown decision.  But real progress in school integration did not happen in 
cities like Los Angeles until the mid-to-late 1960s when the federal government 
encouraged school districts to integrate by tying Great Society funds to compliance. 
 The Brown decision altered the landscape of American race relations.  For 
critical race theorist, Derrick Bell, the central question facing Chief Justice Earl 
Warren was whether or not the racial segregation of children in elementary and 
secondary schools generated “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”4  Spearheading the legal arguments for the plaintiffs was NAACP attorney 
Thurgood Marshall, who contended that “separate educational facilities” were 
“inherently unequal,” and thus, they violated “the plaintiffs‟ rights under the equal 
protection clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.5  Adding 
weight to Marshall‟s arguments were the testimonies of noted African-American 
psychologists, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, who conducted “doll tests” with black and 
white children to determine the extent of ingrained racial prejudices for young school 
students.
6
  Their findings showed a clear preference among both black and white 
children for the white doll, which in turn, indicated “a fundamental conflict at the 
very foundation of the ego structure.”7 
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 For the Warren Court, school segregation perpetuated feelings of inferiority 
amid black children.  Consuming the black psyche were notions of self-hatred, 
frustration, and fear.
8
  According to historian Daryl Michael Scott, whiteness became 
the norm for blacks to the point where it was perfectly natural for blacks to idealize 
white culture.
9
  Such a practice, however, only “proved to be a fatal psychological 
poison,” as white standards were simply unattainable for blacks.10  Having considered 
the psychological aspects of school segregation, the Warren Court voted unanimously 
to end racial discrimination in America‟s public schools.  Yet after a year, the Warren 
Court heard arguments regarding the implementation process of its original ruling.  
The outcome of these hearings was Brown II (1955), which in effect, asserted that the 
first Brown decision “was more symbolic than real” in its monumental claims for 
school integration.
11
 
Brown II set a dangerous precedent.  It placed the responsibility of school 
desegregation in the hands of local school boards.
12
  In doing so, it gave the local 
school boards complete autonomy over how the integration process would occur.  
Chief Justice Warren opined that district courts and local school authorities must 
work in conjunction with each other and act “with all deliberate speed” to eradicate 
racial segregation in the public schools.
13
  The Supreme Court‟s actions, therefore, 
permitted an indefinite delay with respect to implementing desegregation.  If the first 
Brown ruling constituted a national call for desegregation, Brown II almost certainly 
                                                 
8
 Scott, Contempt and Pity, 83. 
9
 Scott, Contempt and Pity, 83. 
10
 Scott, Contempt and Pity, 83. 
11
 Bell, Silent Covenants, 19. 
12
 Nicolaus Mills, Busing U.S.A. (New York: Teachers College Press, 1979), 54. 
13
 Mills, Busing U.S.A., 53. 
  
 
68 
made that call into a regional plea.  Local school boards, especially in the South, 
could easily employ the local autonomy granted to them by Brown II to gerrymander 
their districts so that whites and blacks remained segregated.  By the early 1970s, it 
was clear that drastic measures were necessary to combat the stagnated integration 
process.  One such measure included busing, which first came to prominence in 
Charlotte, North Carolina. 
 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
ruled busing constitutional.  This 1971 decision established a national precedent for 
mandatory busing as a means to affect urban integration.  It also signaled a reversal of 
sentiment among the nine justices sitting in the now Warren Burger Supreme Court.  
When President Richard Nixon appointed Burger as Chief Justice in 1969, he 
intended to inject a conservative sentiment into the Court.  As an advocate of judicial 
restraint, Burger seemed to be the answer for Nixon.  Even so, Burger quickly found 
himself at the center of a judicially active Court, especially concerning the issue of 
school desegregation.  With the Swann ruling, Charlotte became “the national test 
case for busing.”14  Given that Jim Crow segregation was particularly deep-seated 
throughout the South, desegregation busing became the city‟s “proudest 
achievement” during the 1970s.15  Yet busing in Charlotte did not commence in a 
harmonious fashion; it entailed “boycotts and white flight and violence day after day 
in the schools.”16  The Las Vegas busing decision came one year after Swann in 1972 
while the Los Angeles case arrived two years after Milliken in 1976. 
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With Milliken the threat of resegregating America‟s public schools became a 
stark reality.  The Supreme Court curtailed inter-school-district busing by requiring 
hard evidence of deliberately-pursued segregation policies in multiple school 
districts.
17
  Thus, multidistrict busing could no longer serve as a remedy for one 
school district‟s segregation problems.  The Milliken case specifically involved the 
Detroit Board of Education (DBOE), which “maintained optional attendance zones” 
in 53 separate school districts throughout the city‟s metropolitan area.18  Such a 
practice, argued the NAACP, was conducive to the sociological phenomenon known 
as “white flight” where the newer schools built in Detroit‟s outlying neighborhoods 
tended to be “one-race schools” for whites.19  The conditions fostered under these 
circumstances were particularly harmful to Detroit‟s inner-city black population.  
They faced cultural isolation, especially since the DBOE “never bused white children 
to predominantly black schools.”20  To the extent that Milliken perpetuated the 
process of ghetto formation for Detroit‟s blacks, it symbolized a step backward for 
American school desegregation.  And the psychological implications of the inner-city 
isolation that it spawned were widespread. 
One of the major psychological implications associated with the inner-city 
was fear.  As prominent social psychologist Gordon Allport argued, segregation, as a 
racial process rooted in fear, “is a form of discrimination that sets up spatial 
boundaries of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of members of an out-
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group.”21  African Americans were the archetypal out-group who had to confront the 
negative side-effects of their history as slaves and the generalized stigmas concerning 
their physical anatomy.  For Allport, “it is the rule in American cities to find Negroes 
living in segregated regions” where basic social accommodations like housing and 
schools were of significantly less quality than those of whites.
22
  With the guise of 
“preferential thinking,” a “group-norm theory of prejudice” emerged where all social 
groups “develop a way of living with characteristic codes and beliefs, standards and 
enemies to suit their own adaptive needs.”23  Nowhere was this theory more evident 
than in America‟s public schools. 
 Public education is one of the cruxes of American democracy.  It places 
children at the center of society.
24
  Kenneth Clark claimed that schools define the 
collective sentiments of a community, as they “change their policies from traditional 
to progressive or vice versa in order to meet the needs of the children.”25  Under Jim 
Crow, however, “racial symbols” were “so prevalent” in America‟s public schools 
that even young children recognized them.
26
  Exposing children to school segregation 
meant indoctrinating them with attitudes of superiority or inferiority toward other 
races.  Such a practice was counter-productive for not only school desegregation, but 
also for the attainment of values expressed in the “American Creed,” namely equality 
                                                 
21
 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Doubleday, 1958), 52. In the field of 
developmental psychology, Allport‟s work was groundbreaking. It addressed the various forms that 
prejudice could assume as a person‟s mind matured. Public situations, such as schooling, tended to be 
the major areas where people created notions of self-perception. For African Americans who lived in 
racial isolation, they often did not engage in the vital process of self-perception creation by interacting 
with members of other races. 
22
 Allport, Nature of Prejudice, 52. 
23
 Allport, Nature of Prejudice, 38. 
24
 Kenneth B. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child, 2
nd
 Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 3. 
25
 Clark, Prejudice and Your Child, 3. 
26
 Clark, Prejudice and Your Child, 28. 
  
 
71 
and liberty.
27
  Moreover, through parental socialization, a young child begins to 
construct ideas of race that reflect those held by his parents.  The degree to which 
parents impose disciplinary measures on their child often ascertains the level of 
prejudices employed by that child.
28
  Thus, if parents are quick to enforce harsh 
punishments on their child, then the child is more likely to cultivate “intense 
prejudices toward individuals of another race.”29 
 Overall, the historiographical debate and psychological dilemma of school 
desegregation centered on attempting to engender a cross-racial acceptance.  
Although fear constituted a permanent side-effect of the school desegregation 
process, it nevertheless helped to expose the various problems associated with 
segregated schools.  Such problems included the racial imbalances between black and 
white schools and the resultant disparities in per-pupil spending among those 
schools.
30
  For the most part, school integration marked both “an educational success” 
and “a political failure.”31  It succeeded educationally in the sense that members of all 
races gained an equal opportunity to improve themselves through academic 
achievement.
32
  But it failed politically because most of the major decisions 
surrounding the school desegregation process occurred at the hands of local school 
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boards whose largely white members instituted reforms at their own pace and with 
their own interests in mind.
33
 
 
 
Busing in Las Vegas 
 
 In the Western United States, school integration resembled the process in the 
South.  Insofar as Charlotte embodied the ideal model of desegregation busing with 
its large, consolidated school district, Las Vegas served as an intriguing case study 
from which the school integration process for Western cities could be examined.  And 
as a distinctly Western city, Las Vegas developed much later than its Eastern 
counterparts.  If World War I brought African Americans from the South to the 
North, then World War II facilitated African-American migration from the East to the 
West.  The Hoover Dam‟s completion in 1936, along with “an air base, a magnesium 
plant, and a new suburb to house defense workers” by 1942, meant that Las Vegas 
was quickly becoming a metropolitan area.
34
 
 Urbanization in Las Vegas could not have taken place without “federal 
spending, and lots of it.”35  This high degree of federal spending under President 
Franklin Roosevelt‟s New Deal primarily targeted public works projects, which in 
turn, generated a high demand for labor.  Employment opportunities, therefore, 
became available for both black and white workers.  But “by the late 1930s, despite 
their growing importance to the community‟s infant resort industry, blacks faced 
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more segregationist barriers.”36  These barriers included “being denied service not 
only in hotels, but also in a growing number of restaurants and stores.”37  Jim Crow 
further manifested itself when white city officials, anxious to please Southern white 
dam workers, sought to rid Downtown of black business owners through a variety of 
informal actions.
38
  Such actions entailed the systematic refusal of city hall “to renew 
the licenses of black-owned businesses” in the Downtown district unless the owners 
“relocated to the Westside.”39 
 Due to these unofficial social zoning procedures, Las Vegas‟ Westside 
became a black ghetto by the early 1940s.  Its land values were “chronically low,” as 
the area “somehow eluded the building boom occasioned by the Hoover Dam.”40  
Historian Eugene Moehring argued that “police patrols were almost the only symbols 
of the city‟s presence in the Westside.”41  The district faced the prospects of complete 
abandonment by the city, especially when considering the blatant lack of adequate 
municipal services.
42
  Yet the most glaring detriment of the Westside was the 
condition of its schools.  Similar to the situation that sparked Brown, segregation 
existed primarily in the elementary schools.
43
  The main question, however, was 
whether or not the Clark County School District (CCSD) (and its pre-1956 
counterpart, the Las Vegas Union School District) should be held responsible for the 
de facto segregation in the Westside‟s schools. 
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 Segregation in the Westside permeated all levels of its tight-knit ghetto 
society.  Black residents patronized black businesses, which spurred the growth of a 
strong race-based loyalty.  Ethnic bonds, particularly in the context of a segmented 
labor force, tended to trump any kind of overarching class consciousness within the 
boundaries of the Westside.  In fact, black Las Vegans faced both residential and 
commercial confinement between the North-South barriers of Owens Avenue and 
Bonanza Road with Avenue A and Martin Luther King Boulevard (formerly 
Highland Avenue) as the East-West boundaries, respectively (See Map I in 
Appendix).
44
  The Westside‟s confined nature undoubtedly had major psychological 
repercussions for its black residents.  Racially restrictive housing covenants 
contributed to a sense of entrapment, as blacks felt gradually more encircled by 
whites.  By the 1960s, residential segregation in the Westside was a seemingly 
indelible fact of life.  And black Las Vegans were becoming increasingly frustrated 
over the segregated conditions that they endured on a daily basis. 
 Tensions over jobs, housing, and discrimination grew throughout the 1960s, 
reaching a boiling point in 1968.  The Southern Nevada chapter of the NAACP 
finally decided to move against the school segregation problem in the Westside.  As 
the nation‟s foremost civil rights organization, the NAACP believed that school 
desegregation ought to be one of the biggest priorities in combating the larger system 
of societal segregation.
45
  Just one year prior, however, black attorney, Charles 
Kellar, filed a legal complaint regarding job discrimination in Las Vegas‟ “culinary 
                                                 
44
 Matthew, “History of the Las Vegas School Desegregation Case,” 29. 
45
 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 819. 
  
 
75 
and teamsters unions.”46  If attacking labor segregation was for the black adults, then 
tackling school segregation was for the black children.  The NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (LDF) comprised a separate entity designed specifically for the purpose of 
combating segregation through the judicial system.
47
  Having initially started as the 
legal branch of the NAACP in 1910, the LDF gained independent status in 1957.
48
  
Headquartered in New York City, the LDF oversees and maintains local branches in 
regions like Southern Nevada (Clark County) throughout the United States.
49
  Thus, 
the LDF carried out the actual litigation process for desegregation cases, such as the 
1954 Brown decision, which Thurgood Marshall argued before he became a Supreme 
Court Justice in 1967.
50
 
 It was under the guidance of Marshall that Kellar came to Las Vegas in 
1960.
51
  Determined to integrate the city‟s black community, he became the lead 
attorney and president of the local NAACP by 1967.
52
  Like most NAACP lawyers, 
Kellar possessed expert knowledge of constitutional and civil rights law.  And after 
Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he “believed that the law was on his 
side.”53  According to Title IV of the 1964 law, “We [Congress] have tried to point 
out that the progress in school desegregation so well commenced in the period 1954-
57 has been grinding to a halt.”54  Kellar intended to jumpstart the school integration 
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process on a local level in Las Vegas by filing a class-action lawsuit against the 
CCSD in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada on May 13, 1968.
55
  Although 
the CCSD had somewhat anticipated the legal action taken by Kellar and the 
NAACP, it had made little progress in developing a comprehensive and reasonable 
school integration policy.
56
 
 Headed by future Nevada Governor, Kenny Guinn, the CCSD was responsible 
for educating all of the children in Clark County aged 6 to 18.  As the Superintendent 
from 1969 to 1978, Guinn oversaw a majority of the desegregation process.  He 
asserted that the primary cause of the racial segregation in the Westside‟s elementary 
schools “was more geographic” than political or lawful.57  Echoing these sentiments 
was the lead attorney for the CCSD, Robert Petroni.  He contended that the CCSD did 
not have “to integrate racially imbalanced schools because the district did not create 
the imbalance.”58  Kellar, on the other hand, argued that the burden of school 
desegregation rested with the CCSD regardless of what gave rise to the segregation in 
the Westside.
59
  Besides, Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act explicitly stated that 
the NAACP should not have “to take the lead” in desegregating America‟s public 
schools through costly litigation.
60
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 Known as Kelly v. Clark County School District, the Las Vegas school 
integration case proved to be a costly endeavor.
61
  The litigation process spanned four 
years from 1968 to 1972.  In the lawsuit, Kellar claimed that the constitutional rights 
of black Las Vegans, particularly those granted in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, had been knowingly and willingly violated by the CCSD‟s refusal to 
adopt an adequate desegregation plan.
62
  After years of delay, the CCSD proposed the 
“Sixth Grade Center Plan” (SGCP) which provided that the six elementary schools in 
the Westside become sixth grade classrooms that black and white students attended 
from “open zones” throughout Las Vegas.63  These open zones, which did not cover 
all of Clark County, initially hinted that the SGCP was voluntary.
64
  In fact, 
Superintendent Guinn asserted that the CCSD originally thought of desegregating on 
a voluntary basis through the use of magnet schools.
65
  Yet the SGCP‟s voluntary 
nature soon became mandatory when in February 1972, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ordered busing as the primary mechanism for integrating the city‟s black 
and white communities.  In Swann‟s aftermath, school integration, for the courts, 
effectively meant forced busing, as they deemed it the only plausible way to rectify 
the racial imbalances that existed in segregated schools.
66
 
 The transition from voluntary to mandatory busing was an issue that inspired 
much resistance.  Many white parents simply refused to send their children to 
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integrated schools.  Forced busing posed a serious threat to the status quo that middle 
class whites were determined to preserve.  Therefore, according to Superintendent 
Guinn, “the burden of busing was on the black community” in Las Vegas.67  For 
black students living in the Westside, the SGCP obligated them to be bused out of the 
area for “all but one of the 12 mandated years of schooling.”68  Aside from the sixth 
grade year, which involved whites being bused to the Westside, black students had to 
endure one-way busing to white schools.  But “the general feeling in the black 
community was that this inconvenience was better than segregation.”69  Eleven years 
of one-way busing, however, constituted more than just an inconvenience for black 
students.  In white schools, they experienced social isolation as an out-group.  
Psychologically, such a process could only harm the black children‟s collective self-
esteem.  Not seeing black teachers or administrators had affected the motivation of 
black students.
70
  Indeed, the CCSD‟s Task Force on Integration pointed precisely to 
this idea in 1969 when its report stated that black “children should be able to see 
black people in positions of day-to-day power and authority.”71  Unfortunately, one-
way busing prevented this necessary step in the school desegregation process from 
happening. 
 Segregated schools and one-way busing eroded any semblance of stability 
within the CCSD.  In 1969, race riots erupted at various high schools across the Las 
Vegas Valley.
72
  CCSD officials scrambled to modify and implement the SGCP 
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during the litigation process in order to avoid contributing to the growing violence.  
One of the primary points of concern involved the sheer financial costs attached to the 
SGCP.  A year after the Kelly decision, in 1973, the United States Commission on 
Civil Rights published a report entitled “School Desegregation in Ten Communities,” 
which investigated the economics behind the SGCP.
73
  In effect, the CCSD‟s “1972-
73 budget of approximately $64 million” incurred supplemental costs of around $2 
million related to just “desegregating the elementary schools.”74  Thirty new buses -
“each costing $18,000 apiece”- joined the CCSD‟s fleet strictly for the purpose of 
handling “the increase in the number of students” bused to school under the SGCP.75 
 In response to the enormous supplemental costs and perceived violent side 
effects of mandatory busing, an ideology of reactionary populism emerged within the 
city‟s white community.  The Las Vegas Review-Journal carried more stories related 
to busing opposition just prior to the opening of the 1972-73 school year, which was 
the first year of the SGCP.  One story that proved particularly contentious entailed a 
statement from the Deputy Superintendent of the CCSD, Clifford Lawrence, in which 
he claimed that “the busing moratorium bill passed by Congress and signed by 
President Nixon” provided a stay for the school district.76  This article incited a 
controversial string of events that nearly led to a Supreme Court hearing.  Generally 
speaking, the CCSD threatened not to implement the SGCP due to developments in 
the legislative proceedings of Congress and the Nixon administration.  Such a threat 
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was not welcome in either the courts or Las Vegas‟ black community.  A public 
outcry quickly ensued. 
 The public outrage stemming from Deputy Superintendent Lawrence‟s 
comments spurred the courts to act.  Federal district judge, Bruce Thompson, ordered 
the CCSD officials “to appear in court to explain why they should not be held in 
contempt of court” over their “intended violation” of the Kelly ruling.77  According to 
that August 1972 Review-Journal article, Deputy Superintendent Lawrence believed 
that Nixon‟s busing moratorium bill acted as a hold on the SGCP.78  Although the 
CCSD committed a “constitutional violation” by not adhering to the provisions 
stipulated in Swann, the Kelly decision clearly stated that Nixon‟s busing moratorium 
was not self-executing.
79
  Therefore, at the heart of this dilemma sat the U.S. 
Constitution.  The plaintiffs (NAACP) were abiding by the courts while the 
defendants (CCSD) were following the executive and legislative branches.  Was the 
Kelly case single-handedly dissolving the system of checks and balances within 
America‟s governmental structure?  If nothing else, urban desegregation busing, as 
typified by plans like the SGCP, struck at the core of what American democracy truly 
signified. 
 The SGCP went into effect in September 1972.  Judge Thompson denied the 
CCSD‟s motion of appeal regarding a stay on busing.80  But a populist group called 
Bus-Out began to rally around the anti-busing cause.
81
  For the most part, Bus-Out 
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firmly adhered to Nixon‟s busing moratorium bill, which disallowed the 
“transportation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbalances” in the 
public schools.
82
  In demonstrating their opposition to the SGCP, Bus-Out sued the 
CCSD and asked for an injunction from the courts to stop forced busing.
83
  Given the 
controversial nature of busing, grassroots organizations such as Bus-Out were not 
unique to Las Vegas.  In the end, Bus-Out failed to prevent the SGCP from moving 
forward because the courts declined to hear their lawsuit.  As the CCSD prepared to 
integrate the Westside‟s schools through busing, there was an aura of nervous 
anticipation that surrounded Las Vegas in the fall of 1972.  The potential for racial 
disturbances over the SGCP was high, but most city residents understood its 
importance for race relations, and thus, they endured.  Moreover, the suburban cities 
of Henderson and Boulder City as well as unincorporated communities south of Las 
Vegas were not in the mandated busing zone, so there were enclaves where middle 
class white families could flee to escape the traumas of mandatory busing. 
 
 
Busing in Los Angeles 
 
 As in Las Vegas, mandatory busing in Los Angeles entailed the movement of 
black students from an area of high concentration to an area of low concentration.  
Unlike Las Vegas, however, Los Angeles‟ mandatory busing plan also included 
Hispanic (Mexican) students.  It represented a larger sociological diffusion of ethnic 
minorities.  According to historian Josh Sides, racially restrictive housing covenants, 
which the 1948 Supreme Court case Shelley v. Kraemer deemed constitutional yet 
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unenforceable by the judicial process, were “the most entrenched barrier[s] to 
neighborhood integration.”84  And since the Los Angeles Unified School District 
(LAUSD) maintained a neighborhood school policy, residential desegregation 
essentially translated into school integration.  For African Americans living in 
postwar Los Angeles, “residential integration was always about more than just 
owning property -- it was about dignity, opportunity, and their children‟s future.”85 
 Los Angeles‟ black community traditionally faced racial confinement along 
Central Avenue south of Downtown.  The 1920s saw a huge effort, through housing 
covenants, to confine African Americans in this particular area.
86
  But in the postwar 
era, black Angelenos “wanted to move out of areas where they had traditionally been 
concentrated.”87  Their collective drive to suburbanize met fierce resistance, 
especially from “the white working-class suburbs surrounding the South Central” 
black ghetto.
88
  For white suburban Southern Californians, residential and school 
desegregation posed a serious threat to the moral, aesthetical, and financial well-being 
of their neighborhoods and schools.
89
  Even white Angelenos joined the anti-
integration movement by forming the Committee against Integration and 
Intermarriage (CII).
90
  By the early 1960s, Los Angeles‟ blacks were becoming 
increasingly marginalized due to the complete segregation of their community. 
 Making matters worse was the relative ineffectiveness of Los Angeles‟ 
NAACP.  After the Brown decision, school desegregation moved at an extremely 
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slow pace in the city.  Critical race theorist, Derrick Bell, suggested that integration 
efforts only happened if they served the larger interests of the country.
91
  Given the 
importance of the defense industry in postwar Los Angeles Bell‟s “interest-
convergence principle” was particularly pertinent to the city‟s race relations during 
the Cold War.
92
  The Soviets could easily point to the overt contradiction in American 
democracy where blacks endured the detriments of second-class citizenship in a 
society that professed the equality of all.  Chief Justice and former California 
Governor, Earl Warren, regarded this paradox as damaging to the aims of American 
foreign policy, and as a threat to U.S. national security interests.
93
  If Brown initiated 
the school integration process for the nation; it would take another court case to 
desegregate the public schools on a local basis in Los Angeles. 
 The Los Angeles school integration case became known as Crawford v. Board 
of Education of the City of Los Angeles.  It originally began as a class-action lawsuit 
filed against the LAUSD by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in August 
1963.
94
  Yet the case did not receive a final ruling until June 1976.
95
  Undoubtedly, 
the thirteen-year litigation process had negative consequences for Los Angeles‟ 
school desegregation.  In a way, the LAUSD sought to draw out the case for as long 
as possible in an attempt to delay the adoption of an integration plan.  As evidenced 
by Ronald Reagan‟s successful gubernatorial election in 1966, California faced a 
rising tide of “white conservatism,” which stood to hamper school desegregation 
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efforts across the state.
96
  Since the LAUSD refused to integrate its schools, the 
school district, in short, became an emblem of this resurging conservative reaction to 
judicially active courts. 
 Originally argued in Los Angeles Superior Court, the Crawford case faced an 
uphill battle from the start.  In 1970, Judge Alfred Gitelson, a magistrate sympathetic 
to school integration, ordered the LAUSD “to prepare and implement a reasonably 
feasible plan for the desegregation of its schools.”97  Yet the LAUSD appealed the 
ruling to the California Supreme Court, which later affirmed Judge Gitelson‟s 
decision.
98
  The outcome of the Crawford case held vast implications for Los 
Angeles, as a massive integration plan covering “nearly 62,000 elementary school 
children” was to go into effect during the 1977-78 school year.99  With a mixture of 
voluntary and mandatory elements, the LAUSD‟s desegregation plan became the 
largest of its type.  Like the CCSD, the LAUSD initially emphasized the use of 
magnet schools for integration.  But the courts swiftly dismissed that method of 
desegregation, especially since many white parents chose not to send their children to 
magnet schools.  In addition, both the CCSD and the LAUSD targeted multiple 
elementary school grade levels for mandatory desegregation busing. 
 For a school district encompassing some 710 square miles, magnet schools 
made sense from a practical viewpoint.
100
  They were schools that attracted students, 
regardless of race or gender, for specific vocational purposes.  Although critics 
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contended that magnet schools merely served as instruments for maintaining 
segregated schools, proponents saw them as places where a diverse student body 
could gain valuable vocational experience.  The problem, of course, was that magnet 
school attendance occurred on a voluntary basis.  In a school district as large as the 
LAUSD, mandatory measures were necessary to affect any kind of broad-based 
change.  And such change had to occur first in the elementary schools, which 
represented the highest degree of segregation in the district‟s schools at about 60 
percent.
101
  Therefore, as a minimum objective, the LAUSD had to integrate “at least 
50 of the 264 segregated elementary schools” in the district through forced busing.102  
This minimum objective amounted to about 19% of the LAUSD‟s schools with 
segregation problems. 
 The California Supreme Court actually mandated this minimum objective, but 
left the Los Angeles Superior Court to monitor compliance.
103
  Judge Paul Egly 
oversaw the development and implementation of the LAUSD‟s integration plan.104  
Some black activists even wanted him to design the plan, however, that option proved 
too controversial to be viable.
105
  Instead, the LAUSD formed a special committee to 
draw up the eventual desegregation policy.  Known as the Citizens‟ Advisory 
Committee on Student Integration (CACSI), its primary mission was “to reduce racial 
isolation” in Los Angeles‟ public schools through a workable integration strategy.106  
The first recommendations from CACSI to the LAUSD came in August 1976.  They 
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included “a proposal to expand the Permits with Transportation (PWT) program,” 
which was the busing component of the desegregation plan.
107
  Unfortunately, the 
LAUSD did not immediately heed CACSI‟s calls to reform and enhance the district‟s 
integration initiative.
108
 
 By March 1977, CACSI had submitted its final recommendations for a 
desegregation plan to the LAUSD.  In effect, the proposed plan encompassed “a 3-
year period beginning in September 1977” and ending in June 1980.109  It explicitly 
stated that “all schools would be integrated so that no school enrollment would 
exceed 60 percent of one minority.”110  The plan mandated desegregation for the 
LAUSD‟s segregated elementary schools through mandatory busing in the first year 
and for its junior high schools in the second year.  However, integrating senior high 
schools through forced busing in the third year did not occur.  Instead, those schools 
faced the ill-fated prospects of voluntary desegregation “through magnet schools.”111  
Despite CACSI‟s integration proposals, the LAUSD decided that mandatory busing 
would only work best at the fourth, fifth, and sixth grade levels.  Paralleling the 
CCSD‟s Sixth Grade Center Plan in Las Vegas, the LAUSD established “specialized 
learning centers to which fourth, fifth, and sixth graders attending segregated schools 
(75 percent minority or white) would be transported for one 9-week period during the 
school year.”112  Such a plan “allowed for no desegregation from kindergarten 
through third grade” due to concerns over the psychological traumas stemming from 
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busing at such a young age.
113
  Thus, a sharp divide had clearly developed between 
CACSI and the LAUSD over how to properly integrate Los Angeles‟ schools. 
 This divide rapidly manifested itself in a battle between the courts and the 
LAUSD.  Judge Egly and the LAUSD sparred repeatedly over the creation of an 
adequate desegregation plan.
114
  Bill Boyarski, a columnist for the Los Angeles Times, 
described the situation as “a classic confrontation of American government - a judge 
pitted against a school board in a desegregation case, part of a struggle that goes back 
to the days when judges first began ordering school boards to desegregate.”115  This 
depiction basically defined the nature of the school integration debate in many 
American cities during the 1970s.  Mandatory desegregation was an issue that 
garnered much flak, particularly in the realm of politics.  Yet the typical response by 
school boards was “to put pressure on the judge.”116  Nathaniel Jones, an attorney for 
the Los Angeles NAACP, claimed that such a tactic “frees them (the board) of any 
political heat.”117  Making the courts appear like the true villains in the school 
desegregation process was the boards‟ ultimate goal. 
 Even though the Crawford decision ended in 1976, the infighting between the 
courts and the LAUSD turned into a kind of post-trial litigation process.  Judge Egly 
declared the LAUSD‟s integration plan to be “constitutionally deficient under 
California constitutional standards,” as it “neither eliminates nor begins to eliminate 
segregated schools.”118  Yet the LAUSD appealed Egly‟s condemnation to identify 
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the “legal basis” and “constitutional mandate” for desegregation.119  And like the 
Kelly case in Las Vegas, the courts found that segregated schools violated minorities‟ 
(blacks and Hispanics) rights to Equal Protection.
120
  Perhaps the bigger question 
regarding Los Angeles‟ school integration was where the responsibility to bus 
resided.  Of course, the arguments of LAUSD officials resembled those of the CCSD 
in declaring that residential segregation was not the product of their policies.  
Therefore, “the legal burden to desegregate” did not necessarily sit with the 
LAUSD.
121
 
 Another point of contention between the courts and the LAUSD involved the 
disparities in per-pupil spending among segregated schools.  This issue also surfaced 
in the Kelly decision, as schools in the Westside received less funding from the CCSD 
compared to schools in other areas of the school district.
122
  In a court battle that 
raged in the California judicial system at the same time as the Crawford case, the 
1971 Serrano v. Priest decision “declared that the disparities between rich and poor 
[school] districts resulted in unequal – and therefore unconstitutional – distribution of  
funds.”123  Accordingly, the Serrano ruling invalidated “the state‟s system of 
financing schools with local property taxes.”124  In doing so, the California Supreme 
Court sought to attack residential segregation by equalizing school funding.  Since 
residential segregation effectively brought about school segregation, the Crawford 
and Serrano cases were simply another means to combat residential segregation. 
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 The Serrano decision equalized school funding, but it did so at the expense of 
taxpayers.  There was a massive backlash against this court ruling, particularly from 
wealthy Californians who did not want their tax dollars funding poor, inner-city, and 
segregated schools.  In 1978, Californians voted for Proposition 13, which capped 
property taxes throughout the state.  It served as the vehicle through which wealthy 
[white] Californians vented their collective frustrations over the Serrano case.  Yet 
the courts largely ignored this taxpayer revolt.  In fact, the California Supreme Court 
even cited the Serrano decision as a precedent for Crawford, asserting that “wealth 
discrimination in the public school system” constituted a form “of de facto racial 
segregation” that could not stand in a school district as large as the LAUSD.125 
 As if pressure from the courts was not enough, the LAUSD faced lawsuits 
from both the San Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce (SFVCC) and BUSTOP.  
These lawsuits collectively represented the anti-busing faction in Los Angeles.  Both 
the SFVCC and BUSTOP were semi-reactionary organizations that viewed forced 
busing as an unwarranted nuisance.
126
  Given that the city‟s busing initiative 
primarily entailed black and Hispanic students being bused from South Central and 
East Los Angeles to white schools in the San Fernando Valley, the SFVCC claimed 
the Valley had suffered dire economic consequences from busing.
127
  But the courts 
saw no merit in hearing these particular lawsuits, especially since Serrano proved that 
wealth discrimination in California‟s public schools ought to be eliminated even at 
the expense of potential economic harm to a community. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Above all, mandatory busing in the context of school desegregation was a 
unique American phenomenon.  No other Western society engaged in this kind of 
social experiment on such a large scale.  It gained momentum on the coattails of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  The 1954 Brown decision coupled with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act served as two major catalysts for school integration.  Yet it was not until 
the 1971 Swann ruling that busing became a constitutional solution to an 
unconstitutional problem.  As a lingering constitutional legacy from the late 
nineteenth century, the Jim Crow system had become politically unpalatable by the 
early 1970s.
128
  And with forced busing, Jim Crow was once again able to reemerge 
in the ethnoracial fear and violence that materialized during the school desegregation 
process.  Ultimately, the extent to which ethnoracial tensions drove the busing 
movements in Las Vegas and Los Angeles was clearly evident in the legal briefs filed 
for each city‟s court case, as the NAACP and ACLU both emphasized multiform 
racial segregation as the primary problem. 
Upon further examination of the busing process in Las Vegas and Los 
Angeles, there were two main parallels.  First, wealthy whites in both cities were able 
to take their children out of the public schools, and thus, they avoided the negative 
side effects associated with mandatory busing.  Wealthy whites also pointed to the 
ethnoracial violence that stemmed from forced busing to demonstrate that the process 
was simply unacceptable in a society that cherished law and order.  Second, poor 
whites and ethnic minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics, had to endure 
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firsthand the psychological traumas of busing.  The burden of busing undoubtedly 
resided with ethnoracial minorities.  It was their schools that faced closure, and in 
one-way busing plans, they were the ones who had to endure the inconveniences of 
additional transportation measures.  These facts put pressure on the courts to 
recognize the potential harm being done to young students, especially given their 
impressionability.  In the end, however, mandatory busing constituted a necessary 
measure along the road to ridding many of America‟s inner-city public schools of Jim 
Crow segregation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Purpose of Study (Reanalyzed) 
 One of the primary purposes of this study centers on demonstrating how the 
industrial-resort paradigm applies to Las Vegas and Los Angeles.  For the purposes of 
my thesis, Las Vegas signified the resort city with its cornucopia of casinos and 
hotels and Los Angeles represented the industrial city with its coastal trade operations 
and manufacturing core.  The idea of tourism as Las Vegas‟ main source of revenue 
meant that ethnoracial tensions had to be tightly controlled by the city‟s government.  
Los Angeles, alternatively, maintained a more diverse urban economy, and thus, 
interruptions to its revenue stream from race riots and other ethnoracial disturbances 
could be tolerated to a certain degree.  In short, the industrial-resort paradigm serves 
as an important complement to the urban ethnoracial framework. 
 Aside from its complementary role with the urban ethnoracial framework, the 
industrial-resort paradigm promotes the idea that multiform segregation is a uniquely 
urban process marked by the close social interactions of multiple ethnoracial groups.  
In fact, the clustered environments of most urban (and suburban) ghettos and barrios 
encouraged residents to cooperate, especially in adverse situations.  This cooperation 
often led to the development of strong communal bonds, even as the urban crises 
threatened to destroy any semblance of unity among residents in either the ghetto or 
barrio.  But after World War II, the presence of whites in the inner city grew 
increasingly scarce.  In the end, there was a friction of distance between whites and 
other ethnoracial groups that only resulted in fear and mistrust. 
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Revisiting the Urban Ethnoracial Framework 
 Available to historians and sociologists alike, the urban ethnoracial framework 
seeks to explain how multiform segregation can lead to urban crises.  Although it 
generally falls outside the traditional Montgomery-to-Memphis structure of the Civil 
Rights Movement, the urban ethnoracial framework does offer a basic foundation for 
the school desegregation narrative.  And unlike the Montgomery-to-Memphis story, 
which was primarily a Southern phenomenon, the urban ethnoracial framework 
addresses segregation, ghettos/barrios, and riots in any American city that displays 
the pertinent historical or sociological symptoms.  With their extensive racial 
segregation in housing, schooling, and employment, especially at the onset of World 
War II, Las Vegas and Los Angeles appeared ideal when considering the application 
of the urban ethnoracial framework in a comparative historical study. 
 In conducting a comparative historical study, the urban ethnoracial framework 
permits historians to evaluate the history of multiple cities with constant references to 
multiform segregation and the urban crises.  For instance, historian Thomas Sugrue 
found that “segregated housing compounded the urban crisis” and “the combination 
of deindustrialization, white flight, and hardening ghettoization” only muddled urban 
ethnoracial issues.
1
  Even though Sugrue‟s main focus centered on inner-city Detroit, 
his remarks explicitly allude to the urban ethnoracial framework.  But urban 
ethnoracial issues were “as much a political as a social construction.”2  Therefore, the 
urban ethnoracial framework should be flexible in its interpretation of processes such 
as deindustrialization, ghettoization, and segregation. 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 8. 
2
 Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 9. 
  
 
94 
Comparing and Contrasting the Two Cities 
 The primary contribution of my thesis to the pertinent historiography is the 
comparative study it offers of Las Vegas and Los Angeles with respect to ethnoracial 
issues such as segregation and rioting.  Because Las Vegas possessed a smaller 
population than Los Angeles and relied mostly on tourism for municipal revenues, 
race relations were more fluid, and thus, ethnoracial tensions flared and sub-sided in a 
more rapid fashion.  Los Angeles, however, sought to maintain an image of racial 
tolerance to attract a large workforce for meeting the labor demands of its booming 
economy.  This image became shattered due to race riots in the 1940s and 1960s, but 
the city‟s large industrial base was able to absorb most of the detrimental societal 
effects stemming from ethnoracial violence.  Ultimately, these similarities and 
differences can be explained by the industrial-resort paradigm. 
 Since ghettos and barrios signified the outward manifestations of racial 
segregation in each city, clear explanations of them are essential.  Ghettos, in Las 
Vegas and Los Angeles, consisted of African Americans who congregated in 
particular urban and suburban spaces according to cultural affinities such as single-
race housing, jobs, and schools.  Although racially isolated and spatially separated 
from other areas of the city, these ghettos thrived on the spirit of self-reliance.  
Similarly, Los Angeles‟ barrio encompassed Mexican-American neighborhoods with 
distinctive cultural traditions rooted in the Spanish culture.  These cultural traditions 
encountered resistance on occasion from Anglo Americans who viewed the city‟s 
Mexican past as a negative part of its history.  The racial tensions that resulted from 
such an ethnocentric outlook were a major component of the city‟s race riots. 
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Comparative Urban Analysis (Continued) 
 
 To reinforce the comparative urban analysis presented in my thesis, it 
becomes necessary to define the word “urban” and how it relates to Las Vegas and 
Los Angeles.  In effect, urban means city, which demographically defined for the 
purposes of this study would involve a specified area exceeding 30,000 people.  
Under that definition, Las Vegas did not become “urban” until the 1950s.  Los 
Angeles, on the other hand, achieved “urban” status in the late nineteenth century.  
Given the distinct rates of population growth, each city‟s ethnoracial issues developed 
differently.  But the urban ethnoracial framework accounts for these differences by 
also considering geographic features as part of the comparative urban study.  In this 
regard, Las Vegas and Los Angeles are grouped as Western cities with the legacy of 
World War II defense spending as inciting the growth of ethnoracial diversity. 
 Overall, Las Vegas and Los Angeles are two Western cities with histories 
rooted in ethnoracial tension.  This comparative urban study demonstrates how the 
similarities and differences between each city affected the development of multiform 
segregation and the urban crises in housing, employment, and education.  Race riots 
and the ghetto underclass collectively signify intricate by-products of the urban crises 
that multiform segregation precipitated.  Conducting a comparative analysis of the 
ethnoracial histories of both cities reveals that not only was multiform segregation 
present in each one, but also the integration solutions to eradicate it were both gradual 
and ineffective at times.  Ultimately, Las Vegas and Los Angeles serve as poignant 
case studies for investigating the development of urban race relations in the American 
West. 
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